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On October 21, 2010, a cholera outbreak was confirmed 
by the Haitian National Public Health Laboratory (1). By 
November 19, the outbreak had reached every department of 
the country, and by December 17, a total of 121,518 cases of 
cholera, resulting in 63,711 hospitalizations and 2,591 deaths, 
had been reported. By November 16, additional cases of cholera 
had been confirmed in the neighboring Dominican Republic 
and in Florida. Several confirmed cases in the Dominican 
Republic and all confirmed U.S. cases were among travelers 
from Haiti. This report describes cases of cholera identified 
in the Dominican Republic and United States and provides 
recommendations to physicians regarding management of 
travel-related cases. Travelers who develop watery diarrhea 
within 5 days after returning from cholera-affected areas should 
seek health care and report their travel histories. Clinicians 
should enquire about recent travel when evaluating patients 
with diarrhea. When cholera is suspected, rehydration should 
be initiated immediately, a stool specimen should be collected 
for culture of Vibrio cholerae, and public health authorities 
should be notified. 
Dominican Republic
In the Dominican Republic, intensive surveillance for 
cholera-like illness and laboratory testing to confirm cases were 
initiated by the Ministry of Public Health on October 24, 2010. 
Suspected cases were defined as profuse watery diarrhea among 
persons aged ≥5 years, death in a person with acute watery diar-
rhea, or diarrhea among persons with an epidemiologic link to 
a laboratory-confirmed case. Suspected cases were reported to 
the Ministry’s Division of Epidemiology. When possible, rectal 
swabs were collected from suspected cases, transported in Cary 
Blair media, and sent to the National Reference Laboratory for 
confirmation by isolation of V. cholerae and agglutination with 
V. cholerae O1 antiserum. 
Through December 18, a total of 399 suspected cases were 
reported; laboratory testing was performed for at least 327 of 
these cases. V. cholerae O1 serotype Ogawa was identified in 
59 cases; the majority of negative test results were attributed 
to other enteric pathogens for which testing is not performed 
routinely. Three confirmed cases were attributed to importa-
tion from Haiti, one each in the provinces of La Altagracia, 
Independencia and Monte Cristi. The remaining 56 confirmed 
cases occurred in the provinces of Santiago (19), San Juan (11), 
Elías Piña (10), Santo Domingo (10), Dajabón (two), Valverde 
(two), Independencia (one), and Monte Cristi (one). These 56 
cases, with no known association with travel from Haiti, were 
attributed to local transmission (Figure). Of the 59 confirmed 
cases, 46 (78%) resulted in hospitalization; no fatalities have 
been confirmed. 
Three separate outbreaks of cholera, involving 19 of the 
59 confirmed cases, were identified and investigated in the 
Dominican Republic. In El Dique, a resource-poor neigh-
borhood in the capital city of Santo Domingo, eight cases of 
cholera-like illness, including six confirmed cholera cases, were 
identified in two households; investigation suggested house-
hold transmission, although the vehicle of transmission was 
not determined. In a second outbreak in Navarrete, Santiago 
Province, preliminary investigation suggested that contaminated 
canal water was the source of infection for 29 cases of cholera-
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like illness (six confirmed). A third outbreak in Bánica, 
Elías Piña Province, occurred in a community along 
the banks of the Artibonite River near the Haitian 
border and resulted in nine cases (seven confirmed); 
drinking untreated river water was considered the 
most likely source of infection. 
United States
In the United States, cholera is a nationally notifi-
able disease. A confirmed case of cholera is defined by 
the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists 
as a clinically compatible illness in a person from 
whom toxigenic V. cholerae O1 or O139 has been 
isolated from stool or vomitus, or who has serologic 
evidence of recent infection.* After the outbreak was 
confirmed in Haiti, to encourage early reporting of 
suspected cholera cases without waiting for laboratory 
confirmation, the Florida Department of Health cre-
ated two working case classifications for surveillance 
purposes.† A probable case was defined as a clinically 
compatible illness in a person with a stool culture 
that yielded Vibrio species and who recently traveled 
to Haiti or another affected area or who was linked 
epidemiologically to a confirmed case. A suspected 
case was defined as a clinically compatible illness in 
a person who recently traveled to Haiti or another 
affected area or who was linked epidemiologically to 
a confirmed case, but whose stool culture or serology 
results were pending. Case reporting guidelines were 
distributed to county health departments, and clini-
cian advisories were developed and distributed.
As of December 18, a total of 13 cases had been 
investigated by the Florida Department of Health. 
V. cholerae O1 serotype Ogawa was isolated from 
stool specimens of five patients at Florida laborato-
ries. All five developed symptoms during October 
23–November 29, either while in Haiti or on the 
day of arrival in Florida from Haiti. The five patients 
with confirmed cases ranged in age from 9 to 84 years; 
four were female. One patient reported using com-
munity well water in Haiti for drinking and bathing, 
one had eaten several meals in family homes in Haiti, 
and one was a physician who had treated cholera 
patients in Haiti but might have had other exposures. 
In addition to diarrhea, reported symptoms included 
abdominal pain or cramping, vomiting, and lethargy 
or weakness. 
* Case definition available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/
casedef/cholera_current.htm. 
† Available at http://www.doh.state.fl.us/disease_ctrl/epi/acute/
haiti_cholera_impact_surv_guidance_chds_v1.1.pdf.
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Four of the five patients were hospitalized, includ-
ing two who had been evaluated in an emergency 
department, discharged the same day, and readmitted 
2–3 days later. A history of recent travel from Haiti had 
not been elicited on the first emergency department 
visit for one of those patients. All five patients with con-
firmed cholera received intravenous rehydration and 
oral antibiotics, including single doses of doxycycline 
or ciprofloxacin or multiday courses of doxycycline, tet-
racycline, azithromycin, or ciprofloxacin; three patients 
received two different antibiotics. Some treatment 
regimens were not consistent with recommendations. 
No secondary transmission was identified.
Characterization of Isolates
Isolates from four confirmed cases in the Dominican 
Republic and all five Florida cases were sent to CDC 
for confirmation and additional characterization. All 
were confirmed as toxigenic V. cholerae O1, serotype 
Ogawa, biotype El Tor, and matched the Haiti out-
break strain by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis (2). 
Those isolates from Florida cases had the same anti-
microbial susceptibility pattern as the Haiti outbreak 
strain (pending for Dominican Republic isolates). 
CDC’s laboratory assessment of 380 cholera isolates 
subtyped since 2005 has indicated that isolates from 
the cases in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and 
Florida are most similar to a strain previously char-
acterized from South Asia and elsewhere. 
Reported by
PH Jenkins, MPH, HJ Montejano, MS, Broward 
County Health Dept; MJ Abbasi, MD, MS Crowley, 
MS, MG O’Brien, Collier County Health Dept; V Conte, 
MD, M Etienne, MPH, E Rico, MPH, Miami-Dade 
County Health Dept; DG Rea, MPH, Orange County 
Health Dept; RM Baker, MS, EA Burden, LD Gillis, 
PhD, JJ Hamilton, MPH, RS Hopkins, MD, AC Kite-
Powell, MS, E Merlo, Florida Dept of Health. Ministry 
of Public Health, Dominican Republic. Ministry of 
Public Health and Population, Haiti. Pan American 
Health Organization. CDC.
Editorial Note
Less than 4 weeks after the Haitian National Public 
Health Laboratory first confirmed cholera in Haiti and 
before cholera had been identified in all 10 Haitian 
departments, confirmed cases were reported in the 
neighboring Dominican Republic and in a resident 
of Florida who had traveled to Haiti. Transnational 
spread of cholera is not uncommon. In late January 
1991, an outbreak of cholera began in Peru and, by 
1992, had spread to most other countries in Central 
and South America and to the United States (3). 
During 2000–2008, of 51 cholera cases in the United 
States reported to CDC, 29 (57%) were associated 
with international travel.§ 












Provinces with local transmission










* Through December 18, 2010.
§ Information available at http://www.cdc.gov/nationalsurveillance/
cholera_vibrio_surveillance.html.
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Although transnational spread of cholera is caused 
most commonly by importation by travelers, it also 
has been associated with contaminated food that was 
imported commercially (4) or transported by travelers 
(5). Toxigenic V. cholerae also can be transported by 
ships’ ballast water (6). 
Travel between Haiti and other countries predomi-
nantly involves those countries where most expatriate 
Haitians reside (7). In November, of approximately 
60,000 airline passenger seats available on direct 
flights from Haiti, 76% were on flights to the United 
States and U.S. territories, 17% to the Dominican 
Republic and other Caribbean islands, 4% to France, 
2% to Canada, and 2% to Panama.¶ Substantial travel 
also occurs across the border between Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic.
More cholera cases associated with the current 
outbreak in Haiti are expected. In preparation for an 
anticipated increase in holiday travel, public health 
authorities in countries receiving travelers from Haiti 
should consider the need to heighten surveillance 
for cholera and educate clinicians to be vigilant for 
cholera-like illness in patients who have traveled 
from cholera-affected areas. CDC is distributing 
Travel Health Alert Notices to travelers from Haiti 
to the United States, advising them to seek health 
care promptly if they develop diarrhea within 5 days 
after arrival.
Although the risk for acquiring cholera during 
travel is low (8), travelers can reduce their risk for 
cholera and other enteric infections by drinking and 
using water that has been boiled or treated or is sup-
plied in cans or bottles, eating only food that has been 
cooked and served hot, paying vigorous attention to 
handwashing with soap, and avoiding swimming or 
bathing in rivers. Health-care providers and persons 
traveling to Haiti or other cholera-affected countries 
should consult CDC,** World Health Organization 
(WHO),†† or Pan American Health Organization 
(PAHO)§§ websites for general information about 
international travel and for specific information 
related to cholera. Neither cholera vaccine nor 
chemoprophylaxis is indicated for U.S. travelers to 
Haiti. CDC, the Haitian Ministry of Public Health 
and Population, PAHO, and other organizations are 
evaluating the potential role of cholera vaccines for 
populations in Haiti and other countries. 
Physicians evaluating patients with diarrhea 
should obtain a travel history. If cholera is suspected, 
clinicians should initiate rehydration, treat hospital-
ized patients with antibiotics, obtain a stool specimen 
for culture before starting antibiotic treatment (if indi-
cated), and report the case to public health authorities. 
The risk for person-to-person transmission is low, and 
isolation of cholera patients or quarantine of asymp-
tomatic travelers from affected areas is not warranted. 
However, persons in sensitive occupations, such as 
food preparation, child care or health care, should 
not work while they have diarrhea. 
The mainstay of cholera treatment is vigorous oral 
or intravenous rehydration. Antibiotics can reduce 
the volume and duration of diarrhea and should be 
given to hospitalized patients. A single dose of doxy-
cycline by mouth (300 mg for nonpregnant adults; 
2–4 mg/kg for children, not to exceed 300 mg) is the 
preferred regimen. A single dose of azithromycin (1 g 
by mouth) is recommended for pregnant women. 
Alternative therapies and additional guidance for 
clinicians are available from CDC¶¶ and PAHO.
What is already known on this topic? 
A cholera outbreak has spread rapidly through Haiti 
since October 2010. Transnational spread of cholera is 
not uncommon. 
What is added by this report? 
Cholera has now been confirmed in the Dominican 
Republic and Florida, and the strains are indistinguish-
able from the strain causing the outbreak in Haiti. 
Secondary spread in the Dominican Republic has 
been limited to date; in the United States, no trans-
mission to household contacts has been reported.
What are the implications for public health practice?
Additional cases of cholera in travelers from Haiti are 
likely to occur in the United States, the Dominican 
Republic, and elsewhere. Clinicians should ask 
patients with diarrhea about their travel history. If 
cholera is suspected, clinicians should initiate rehy-
dration, treat hospitalized patients with antibiotics, 
obtain a stool specimen for culture before starting 
antibiotic treatment (if indicated), and report the case 
to public health authorities. 
¶ Information obtained December 3, 2010, from https://www.airline 
planning.com.
 ** Available at http://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel.
 †† Available at http://www.who.int/ith/en.
 §§ Available at http://new.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_con
tent&task=view&id=4500&Itemid=3527&lang=en.
 ¶¶ Available at http://www.cdc.gov/haiticholera/consider-cholera.htm.
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The Florida Department of Health provided 
advisories to clinicians, prompting correct referral of 
specimens to clinical laboratories. Because Vibrio spe-
cies require special media for isolation, the laboratory 
should be notified to suspect cholera. Specific infor-
mation on V. cholerae culture methods and specimen 
transport can be found at CDC’s cholera website.*** 
In the United States, all suspected cholera isolates 
should be sent to state public health laboratories and 
from there to CDC for confirmation and additional 
characterization. 
The potential for secondary transmission of chol-
era is low in countries where sanitation, water, and 
food production systems minimize the risk for fecal 
contamination. Only two instances of secondary 
transmission in the United States have been reported 
since 1965 (8,9). Spread within the Dominican 
Republic has been limited to date, as is typical in 
countries with improved water and sanitation infra-
structure.††† Nonetheless, the risk for secondary and 
ongoing transmission of cholera remains high in 
populations with limited access to improved water 
sources and sanitation. 
An increase in reported cases of cholera associ-
ated with holiday travel to cholera-affected areas is 
anticipated in the United States and other countries. 
Travelers are encouraged to take precautions, and 
providers should suspect cholera in patients with 
diarrhea and recent travel to cholera-affected areas. All 
suspected cases should be reported to public health 
authorities, and stool samples should be collected 
under appropriate conditions to increase the yield of 
V. cholerae. In 2009, 45 countries reported 221,226 
cases of cholera to WHO (10). The persistence of 
cholera in any country puts other countries at risk. 
Until cholera is controlled around the world, importa-
tions to other countries probably will continue, and 
areas with poor water and sanitation infrastructure 
will be at risk for transmission. Public health authori-
ties in unaffected countries should be vigilant in 
monitoring for cholera introductions and take public 
health actions to prevent its spread. 
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On July 6, 2009, the Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network received notification of 
possible disease transmission. A transplant center 
in California (TCA) reported a kidney transplant 
recipient with Escherichia coli urinary tract infection 
and sepsis suspected to have been contracted from 
the donated kidney. Upon further investigation, a 
transplant center in Texas (TCB) reported that the 
recipient of the other kidney from the same donor 
developed a perinephric abscess caused by E. coli. The 
kidney grafts failed in both recipients; however, both 
recipients survived. E. coli isolates from both recipi-
ents demonstrated similar antimicrobial susceptibility 
profiles. Molecular typing studies conducted at CDC 
showed that the E. coli isolates from both kidney 
recipients were identical to an isolate from the donor’s 
urine. On October 30, 2009, the Texas Department 
of State Health Services requested assistance from 
CDC to investigate this transplant-associated E. coli 
transmission and make recommendations to prevent 
future transmissions. The investigation identified gaps 
in communicating important donor information that 
might have adversely affected transplant outcomes. 
Each organ procurement organization (OPO) should 
establish protocols that clearly assign responsibilities 
for receiving, reviewing, and conveying any relevant 
donor information that becomes available subsequent 
to organ procurement. 
Organ Donor
The donor, a woman aged 56 years, was admitted 
to the intensive-care unit for a subarachnoid hemor-
rhage. She was found to have multiple cerebral artery 
aneurysms and underwent surgery with aneurysm 
clipping 2 days after admission. Postoperatively, she 
developed a spasm of the internal carotid artery and 
subsequent rupture of the vessel during emergent 
angioplasty. Attempts to stabilize the patient were 
unsuccessful, and she was pronounced brain dead 7 
days after admission. Family consent was obtained 
to donate her organs, and medical management was 
assumed by OPO A. Organ recovery was performed 
on the ninth day after admission. 
Three days before being pronounced brain dead 
and 5 days before organ recovery, the donor became 
febrile, and urinalyses showed hematuria (red blood 
cell [RBC] count of 75–100/mm3), pyuria (white 
blood cell [WBC] count of >200/mm3, a few WBC 
clumps, and a large amount of leukocyte esterase), 
and bacteriuria (bacteria 2+ and positive for nitrite). 
A urine culture performed on the same day was 
positive for E. coli susceptible to ampicillin, cefazolin, 
gentamicin, levofloxacin, nitrofurantoin, tobramycin, 
and trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole (Table). Four 
days before organ recovery, the donor received cipro-
floxacin for treatment of her urinary tract infection. 
After urine culture results were available, ciprofloxacin 
was changed to levofloxacin, which was administered 
3 days to 1 day before organ recovery. Two days to 
1 day before organ recovery, the patient was admin-
istered cefazolin prophylactically in accordance with 
the OPO’s procurement protocol. 
A urine specimen collected 2 days before organ 
recovery showed improved hematuria (RBC count of 
3–5/mm3), mild pyuria (WBC count of 5–10/mm3), 
and mild bacteriuria. At the time these laboratory 
results were available, OPO A collected the donor’s 
urine for culture in accordance with its organ procure-
ment protocol. The culture was sent to an outside 
commercial laboratory contracted by OPO A; the 
result was positive for multidrug-resistant E. coli 
(Table) and reported to OPO A 2 days after organ 
recovery. 
Left Kidney Recipient
The left kidney recipient, a woman aged 64 years 
with end-stage renal disease secondary to diabetes and 
hypertension, chronic hepatitis C infection, and a 
4-year history of hemodialysis, had the transplant per-
formed by TCA on the day the kidney was procured 
by OPO A. Her postoperative course was uneventful, 
and she was discharged on day 5 after transplant on 
trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole, as well as antiviral, 
antifungal, and immunosuppressive medications. 
The patient was followed routinely in the postopera-
tive clinic with adjustments in her medications for 
blood pressure and glucose control. Dosages were 
not available, except for 1 tablet of trimethoprim/
sulfamethoxazole (160 mg trimethoprim and 800 
mg sulfamethoxazole) administered on day 8 after 
Transmission of Multidrug-Resistant Escherichia coli Through 
Kidney Transplantation — California and Texas, 2009
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transplant. No fever was documented, and urinalyses 
performed during these visits were not suggestive of 
infection. 
On day 26 posttransplant, the patient developed 
fever and chills and was evaluated in the emergency 
department. On this visit, her urinalysis was normal, 
but her creatinine had risen to 2.2 mg/dL from 
1.0 mg/dL (normal: 0.6–1.2 mg/dL) on the previ-
ous day. Pseudoaneurysm at the arterial anastomosis 
site was diagnosed, and the recipient underwent left 
nephrectomy on day 28 after transplant. Urine culture 
2 days after nephrectomy showed multidrug-resistant 
E. coli (Table). OPO A was contacted to assess the 
outcome of the donor’s right kidney transplant.
The left kidney recipient’s urine culture results 
showed the same multidrug-resistant E. coli as was 
identified in the donor urine 2 days after organ pro-
curement. In addition, procurement of the left kidney 
and delivery to TCA was coordinated by a second 
OPO (OPO B), which collected perfusate solution 
in which the left kidney was immersed. Cultures of 
this perfusate solution were available to OPO B on 
day 3 after organ procurement and showed multidrug-
resistant E. coli (Table). Neither of these culture results 
was documented in the left kidney recipient’s medical 
records. The recipient survived and was discharged on 
day 13 after nephrectomy.
TABLE. Culture results that were positive for Escherichia coli and results of antimicrobial susceptibility testing for kidney donor and recipients 
— California and Texas, 2009
E. coli testing sequence Donor Left kidney recipient Right kidney recipient*




Testing facility Donor 
hospital
OPO A OPO B TCA TCA TCA TCB TCB TCB TCB TCB



































































Amikacin S S S S S S S S S
Amoxicillin/clavulanate S R
Ampicillin/sulbactam R R R R R
Ampicillin S R R R R R R R R R R
Cefazolin S R R R R R R R R R R
Cefepime S S S S S S` S
Cefotaxime S S
Ceftazidime R I I R R R R
Ceftriaxone I R S R I R I R
Cefuroxime R R R R R
Cephalothin R
Ciprofloxacin R R
Gentamicin S S I I I R I I I I I
Imipenem S S S S
Levofloxacin S R R R R R R R R R R
Meropenem S S S S S S
Minocycline S
Nalidoxic acid R
Nitrofurantoin S I S S
Norfloxacin R R
Piperacillin/tazobactam R S S S S S S S S S
Tobramycin S I I I I I I I I
Ticarcillin/clavulanate R
Trimethoprim/
sulfamethoxazole S R R R R R R R R R R
Abbreviations: OPO A = organ procurement organization A; OPO B = organ procurement organization B; TCA = transplant center A (California); TCB = transplant center B (Texas); S = susceptible; 
R = resistant; I = intermediate.
* Two additional cultures were performed that did not include antimicrobial susceptibility testing: a tissue culture (collected on day 20 posttransplant, final report available in 7 days) that 
grew moderate E. coli and an abdominal wound culture (collected on day 15 post-nephrectomy, final report available in 5 days) that grew scant E. coli.
† No preliminary report available.
§ Shaded cells indicate antimicrobials already being administered at the time specimens were collected for culture.
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Right Kidney Recipient
The right kidney recipient was a woman aged 
47 years with end-stage renal disease secondary to 
diabetes mellitus and hypertension and a history 
of hemodialysis. The transplant procedure was per-
formed by TCB on the day of kidney procurement 
and the patient received perioperative ceftriaxone and 
kanamycin. One week after transplant, abdominal 
tenderness and an increase in creatinine were noted, 
and ultrasound and scintigraphy showed evidence of 
acute tubular necrosis (ATN). On the same day, cul-
tures obtained by TCB from perfusate solution used 
for transporting the right kidney were reported to have 
scant growth of multidrug-resistant E. coli (Table). 
These culture results were not documented in the right 
kidney recipient’s medical records. Kidney biopsy 
results on day nine after transplant were consistent 
with microangiopathy, early acute cellular rejection, 
and ATN; perinephric fluid collection was noted on 
a computerized tomography scan. 
The patient was administered prophylactic 
trimethoprim/sulfamethoxazole during days 1–13 
after transplant (80 mg trimethoprim and 400 mg 
sulfamethoxazole, 1 tablet daily). Her antimicrobials 
were changed to piperacillin/tazobactam on day 15, 
after a blood culture performed on day 13 indicated 
growth of E. coli with antimicrobial susceptibility 
identical to the perfusate culture isolate. On the same 
day, the patient complained of flank pain in the kidney 
area. A computerized tomography scan and Doppler 
sonogram indicated hemorrhagic fluid suggestive 
of pyelonephritis and perinephric hematoma in the 
transplanted kidney. Drainage of the perinephric 
abscess was performed on day 16 after transplant, and 
aspirate culture results showed the presence of E. coli 
with a resistance pattern identical to the isolates from 
the previous urine and perfusate cultures (Table). 
On day 20 after transplant, a laparotomy was per-
formed. An intraoperative biopsy of the transplanted 
kidney showed findings consistent with infection, 
including eosinophylic fibrillar glomeruli, thickened 
vessels, foci of interstitial fibrosis, and ATN sugges-
tive of severe hemolytic uremic syndrome damage. 
The kidney was removed because of poor probability 
of future graft function. The patient developed a 
wound infection with multidrug-resistant E. coli with 
the same resistance pattern as the previous isolates; 
however, she recovered and was discharged 33 days 
after nephrectomy. Results of the donor urine culture 
obtained by OPO A were not documented in the right 
kidney recipient’s chart (Table).
Reported by
W Chung, MD, Dallas County Health and Human 
Svcs; N Pascoe, G Heseltine, MD, Texas Dept of State 
Health Svcs; Y Qazi, MD, USC University Hospital, 
California.WA Bower, MD, M Kuehnert, MD, M Wise, 
PhD, Div of Healthcare Quality Promotion, National 
Center for Emerging and Zoonotic Infectious Diseases; 
Y Zheteyeva, MD, EIS Officer. 
Editorial Note
Donor-derived infection in solid organ recipients 
is a serious concern, and can lead to catastrophic 
consequences, including graft loss and death of the 
organ recipient (1–3). However, bacterial infections 
are relatively common in donors, and transplantation 
of organs from donors with known bacterial infec-
tion is performed, provided that transplant teams are 
aware of the infection and appropriate antimicrobial 
therapy is initiated to treat the infection in donor and 
recipients (4–6).
What is already known on this topic?
Transplant-transmitted bacterial infection can lead to 
catastrophic consequences in the organ recipient.
What is added by this report?
Escherichia coli infection with multidrug resistance 
was transmitted from a donor to two transplant 
recipients, resulting in the loss of both transplanted 
kidneys; critical gaps were identified in communicat-
ing information regarding the donor’s E. coli infection.
What are the implications for public health practice? 
Although transplantation of organs from donors 
with bacterial infection can be managed, transplant 
teams need to be aware of all donor test results so 
that appropriate antimicrobials can be used to treat 
the recipient and avoid complications of an infected 
organ. To improve organ transplant safety, each organ 
procurement organization (OPO) should have stan-
dard procedures to ensure timely and accurate com-
munication of donor-related information between 
OPOs and transplant centers, including donor 
information that becomes available after organs are 
procured.
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Timely communication of important donor-
related information is critical to ensure appropriate 
prophylactic antimicrobial therapy and prevent 
development of infection in organ recipients. This 
communication is especially important when a 
multidrug-resistant pathogen is involved, because 
these organisms might not be susceptible to standard 
empiric antimicrobial treatment regimens. Since 
transplantation must be done expeditiously to ensure 
organ viability, the results of some cultures and tests of 
specimens collected at the time of organ procurement 
sometimes become available only after the transplant 
has been performed (7). Culture results that are avail-
able after organ procurement must be communicated 
promptly to medical teams in transplant centers (8) 
so that timely and adequate antimicrobial prophylaxis 
or treatment is initiated in recipients. 
In this investigation, several failures to commu-
nicate important information were identified. The 
results from the donor urine culture performed 5 
days before organ recovery were entered incorrectly 
as negative by OPO A in both the donor chart that 
accompanied the donated organs and in DonorNet, 
a secure web-based computer system that provides 
donor information to transplant centers. Multiple 
cultures were obtained during the course of the organ 
procurement process by OPO A, OPO B, TCA, and 
TCB. Cultures from all four entities were positive for 
multidrug-resistant E. coli, and results were finalized 
within 2–7 days after organ procurement. However, 
because neither the OPOs nor the transplant centers 
maintained communication logs, no means existed to 
verify that these culture results were shared among the 
entities. In addition, no documentation was entered 
in the recipients’ medical records of E. coli infection 
in the organ donor, and no change in the recipients’ 
antimicrobial regimen was noted that might have 
indicated knowledge of this information. A failure 
was noted in communicating perfusate culture results 
from the TCB laboratory to the TCB transplant team, 
which resulted in delay in initiating appropriate anti-
microbial treatment in the right kidney recipient.
Several measures can improve communication 
during organ procurement from deceased donors. In 
the package of accompanying documents that OPOs 
prepare for every donated organ (9), all positive test 
results (e.g., from urinalysis or blood or urine cul-
ture), should be highlighted to draw the attention of 
physicians in transplant centers. To avoid transcrip-
tion errors, OPOs should consider double-checking 
(by at least two OPO staff members) critical donor 
information against medical records in the donor’s 
hospital. Any pending tests with results that could 
affect the organ recipient’s safety (e.g., culture results) 
and the dates when these pending results will become 
available should be noted in documents accompany-
ing the organ. Transplant center case coordinators 
should contact the OPO on the date of expected 
availability of laboratory results if the OPO has not 
already notified the transplant center of these results. 
All important new donor information should be 
documented in recipient medical records at transplant 
centers.
Each OPO should establish a standard protocol 
for receiving and conveying any relevant donor 
information that becomes available subsequent to 
organ procurement. At a minimum, these standard 
protocols should include establishment of clear lines 
of communication among designated personnel at the 
host OPO and all transplant centers, other involved 
OPOs, and tissue and eye banks, to enable prompt 
sharing of important information obtained after organ 
procurement with the medical teams responsible for 
care of transplant recipients. This information should 
include information obtained from medical records, 
family interviews, and laboratory testing. The protocol 
should include a mechanism to communicate new or 
updated information within 24 hours of availability of 
this information to the medical teams caring for the 
transplant recipients. OPOs should consider develop-
ing and maintaining surge capacity for updating pend-
ing results and rapidly communicating new medical 
and laboratory information to transplant centers, so 
that these functions can continue without interrup-
tion or delay even when organ procurement activity 
is increased above baseline for an OPO or a key point 
of contact is absent. In addition, communication logs 
to document transmission and receipt of information 
should be maintained by transplant centers, OPOs, 
and tissue and eye banks. 
To avoid internal communication failures, trans-
plant center case coordinators should follow up with 
hospital laboratories on all culture results. These 
results must be documented in patient’s medical 
records.
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In August and September 2009, PulseNet, the 
national molecular subtyping network for foodborne 
disease surveillance, detected a multistate cluster of 
Salmonella Montevideo infections with an indis-
tinguishable pulse-field gel electrophoresis (PFGE) 
pattern (XbaI PFGE pattern JIXX01.0011). Cases 
were geographically dispersed, and the age and sex 
distributions were typical for reported Salmonella 
cases. Montevideo is the seventh most common 
Salmonella serotype in the United States; of 1,225 
PFGE patterns in the PulseNet Montevideo database, 
the outbreak strain pattern is the most common. 
PulseNet monitored this pattern and detected an 
increase in the number of isolates in November 2009, 
leading CDC to begin coordinating a multistate 
investigation. This report summarizes the results of 
that investigation, which identified 272 cases from 44 
states and the District of Columbia, with illness onset 
from July 1, 2009, to April 14, 2010. In a multistate 
case-control study, consumption of salami was associ-
ated with illness. Purchase information from member-
ship card records helped determine specific brands of 
Italian-style meat products associated with cases. The 
outbreak strain was identified in salami products, one 
company A facility environmental sample, and sealed 
containers of black and red pepper used to produce 
company A salami products. This outbreak high-
lights the importance of preventing post-processing 
contamination of ready-to-eat products from raw 
ingredients such as spices.
Epidemiologic Investigation
To detect associations between risk factors and 
illness, a structured questionnaire was used that 
asked whether patients had exposure to any of the 
approximately 300 food and animal items in the 
week before illness onset. Fifty-three questionnaires 
from patients in 18 states were completed during 
November 30–December 16, 2009. Most frequently 
reported foods included eggs, chicken, and bananas. 
When compared with the percentage of the popu-
lation that report eating those specific foods, no 
hypothesis emerged. Next, open-ended interviews 
of 16 patients from eight states were conducted 
from December 16, 2009, to January 14, 2010. 
Twelve patients (75%) reported consumption of any 
Italian-style meats in the week before illness onset, 
nine (75%) reported eating salami, and nine (58%) 
reported shopping at a national warehouse store chain. 
From December 18, 2009, to January 14, 2010, the 
Washington State Department of Health (WADOH) 
collected information from seven patients regarding 
food purchased at national warehouse chain using 
information obtained from membership cards*; five 
of the seven patients purchased and consumed a 
company A salami product before illness onset. State 
health departments and CDC collected additional 
membership card information from patients. Among 
35 patients with membership cards, 19 purchased 
company A salami products before illness onset: 16 
purchased a company A salami variety package, and 
three purchased a company A salami deli tray. Both 
products contained pepper-coated salami. 
State and local health departments and CDC 
conducted a case-control study during January 
16–20, 2010. Case-patients who had specimen col-
lection dates after September 15, 2009, were enrolled. 
Controls were well persons matched to cases by neigh-
borhood.† Case-patients were asked about exposures 
a week before illness onset; controls were asked about 
exposures in the week before the interview. Forty-three 
case-patients and 43 controls were enrolled from 20 
states. Case-patients were more likely than controls 
to report consumption of salami (matched odds ratio 
[mOR] = 8.0) (Table). Consumption of any Italian-
style meat, including salami, capocollo, calabrese, or 
sopressata, was significantly associated with illness 
(mOR = 4.5). Adding freshly ground black pepper 
to foods was not associated with illness.
Salmonella Montevideo Infections Associated with Salami 
Products Made with Contaminated Imported Black and Red 
Pepper — United States, July 2009–April 2010
* Membership cards used in this investigation were from a national 
warehouse store chain. Members must use their card to purchase 
products, and customer purchases can be tracked by the chain for 
sales and product safety purposes.
† Controls were matched using a reverse address directory protocol. 
Potential controls were selected by entering a neighboring street 
address and zip code of each patient into a reverse address search 
engine. The search engine will produce telephone numbers of 
residents in the same neighborhood as the case-patient. 
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As of April 30, 2010, a total of 272 patients from 
44 states and the District of Columbia were reported; 
illness onset dates ranged from July 1 to April 14, 
2010 (Figure).§ Median age of patients was 37 years 
(range: <1–93 years); 53% (144 of 272) were female. 
Twenty-six percent (52 of 203) were hospitalized; no 
deaths were reported.
Product Testing and Traceback
Initial testing conducted by a private laboratory of 
unopened company A salami purchased at retail found 
Salmonella Senftenberg, a different Salmonella sero-
type, with PFGE pattern JMPX01.0004. WADOH 
subsequently tested the bacterial culture from the 
private laboratory and identified S. Senftenberg as 
well as the outbreak strain of S. Montevideo. The 
State Hygienic Laboratory at the University of Iowa 
isolated the outbreak strain of S. Montevideo from 
leftover salami from a patient’s home. In total, either 
the outbreak strain or S. Senftenberg was isolated from 
six open company A salami products collected from 
patients’ homes and three sealed retail products. The 
products contained peppered salami, spicy sopressata, 
spicy calabrese, or prosciutto.
From July 1, 2009, to April 14, 2010, PulseNet 
identified 11 persons who had illness caused by 
S. Senftenberg with PFGE pattern JMPX01.0004. 
Among nine ill persons interviewed, two reported 
purchasing a recalled salami product during the week 
before illness onset. These cases were not included in 
the overall case count.
On January 23, 2010, company A voluntarily 
recalled approximately 1.3 million pounds of ready-
to-eat salami products.¶ On January 31, the recall 
was expanded, adding approximately 17,000 pounds 
of product after Salmonella was isolated from an 
unopened retail company A peppered salami prod-
uct collected by the Illinois Department of Public 
Health. Based on epidemiologic information pro-
vided by the Minnesota Department of Health, the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture Food Safety and 
Inspection Service (USDA-FSIS) collected additional 
salami products for testing and identified the outbreak 
strain. On February 16, the recall was expanded again 
to include approximately 115,000 pounds of salami 
products.
A multiagency investigation conducted by USDA-
FSIS, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and 
the Rhode Island Department of Health (RIDOH) 
at company A revealed black and red pepper applied 
to salami products post-lethality** was contaminated 
with Salmonella. Testing by RIDOH found the 
outbreak strain in 29% (five of 17) of black pepper 
samples and 9% (one of 11) of red pepper samples 
intended for use in production of company A salami 
products. FDA initiated investigations at pepper sup-
pliers of company A: spice company B, spice company 
C, and spice company D. Samples of spice companies 
B and D pepper collected by FDA and RIDOH at 
company A tested positive for the outbreak strain. 
As a result, spice company B voluntarily recalled 
approximately 53,000 pounds of crushed red pepper 
on February 25, 2010, and spice company D volun-
tarily recalled two lots of black pepper totaling nearly 
55,000 pounds on March 5, 2010. During March 
1–30, a total of 12 additional recalls were issued by 
companies that received the initial pepper products 
associated with spice companies B and D. 
Pepper tracebacks revealed that the pepper origi-
nated from three Asian countries. Based on traceback 
TABLE. Number and percentage of Salmonella Montevideo case-patients and controls reporting consumption of salami, 
any Italian style meat, or fresh ground pepper — United States, July 1, 2009–April 14, 2010
Food item
Case-patients (n = 43) Controls (n = 43)
mOR (95% CI)No (%) No. (%) 
Salami 22  55.0 6 15.4 8.0 (1.9–71.1)
Any Italian style meat* 25 58.1 9 21.9 4.5 (1.7–14.7)
Freshly ground black pepper 26  66.7 28 70.0 0.8 (0.3–2.1)
Abbreviations: mOR = matched odds ratio; CI = confidence interval.
* Includes salami, capocollo, calabrese, sopressata, and prosciutto.
§ If onset dates were not available, the date was estimated using the 
isolation date minus 3 days. 
¶ Additional information available at http://www.fda.gov/safety/recalls/
default.htm and http://www.fsis.usda.gov/fsis_recalls/index.asp. 
 ** The lethality step for salami production is the fermenting and 
drying stages of the process. Ready-to-eat products can become 
contaminated if raw materials or ingredients, such as pepper, are 
added after the lethality step.
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information, no S. Montevideo was isolated from 
samples collected earlier in the distribution chain than 
company A. The number of S. Montevideo cases with 
the outbreak strain identified by PulseNet returned to 
the baseline of sporadic cases by early 2010.
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Editorial Note
This nationwide outbreak of Salmonella Montevideo 
infections was associated with salami products con-
taining contaminated imported black and red pepper. 
This outbreak highlights the importance of preventing 
product contamination between its production and 
its use and the potential for spices, such as pepper, to 
contaminate ready-to-eat products. 
Several Salmonella outbreaks associated with 
salami and other fermented sausage products have 
been reported from Europe (2–6). However, these 
outbreaks were caused by insufficient curing time, low 
water activity, and high pH of the salami, allowing 
Salmonella to survive (2–6). In contrast, the outbreak 
described in this report was from contaminated pepper 
applied to salami after lethality steps. Although spices 
are sometimes known to harbor various fungi and 
bacteria, few reports have documented spices as being 
associated with human illness. Eight spice-associated 
Salmonella outbreaks occurred during 1973–2009, 
accounting for 1,656 human illnesses. In September 
2008, an outbreak of Salmonella Rissen infections 
was associated with ground white pepper (J. Higa, 
CDC, personal communication, 2009). An increas-
ing number of dried spice recalls have occurred over 
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the past several years, with only two during the 1990s 
and 16 during 2000–2004 (7). Effective methods 
exist to treat spices, including steam, ethylene oxide 
treatments, and irradiation. However, companies are 
not required to treat spices, and manufacturers are not 
required to use treated spices in their products. These 
methods have increased importance given the frequent 
use of spices in ready-to-eat foods and the potential for 
contaminated spices to cause widespread outbreaks. 
FDA is working with spice trade organizations and 
with other agencies to develop recommendations on 
spice safety standards and to safeguard against con-
taminated spices entering commerce.
Membership cards helped provide important 
brand-specific information in this investigation. 
During hypothesis generation, it was learned that 
many patients reported shopping at different loca-
tions of a national warehouse chain. This prompted 
WADOH to collect data on items purchased 
by patients based on membership card records. 
Information gathered from these cards, with patient 
permission, helped determine the brand name and 
purchase dates of implicated products. Based on 
this information, USDA-FSIS traced back lots of 
ingredients, which helped FDA identify lots of black 
and red pepper used to produce the contaminated 
salami products. As this investigation demonstrates, 
membership and shopper cards can provide critical 
information to quickly identify potentially contami-
nated foods and should be considered for use in future 
foodborne disease outbreak investigations.
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What is already known on this topic?
 Salmonella commonly causes foodborne illness; 
ingredient-driven outbreaks are difficult to detect.
What is added by this report?
Spice-associated outbreaks of foodborne illness 
have been reported with increasing frequency in the 
United States. Technologies such as PulseNet and 
detailed electronic purchase records maintained by 
some merchants can help detect the source of out-
breaks during multistate investigations. 
What are the implications for public health practice?
Spices should be considered as possible sources 
for any foodborne Salmonella outbreak in the 
United States, especially for widespread outbreaks. 
Membership and shopper cards used to maintain 
customer purchase databases can be powerful tools 
to link ill persons with specific food exposures.
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During October 3–December 11, 2010, influenza 
activity remained low in most regions of the United 
States. Influenza viruses characterized thus far in 
the influenza season are well matched to the strains 
included in the 2010–11 influenza vaccine. This 
report summarizes U.S. influenza activity* during 
this period.
Viral Surveillance 
During October 3–December 11, approximately 
140 World Health Organization (WHO) and 
National Respiratory and Enteric Virus Surveillance 
System collaborating laboratories in the United States 
tested 42,497 respiratory specimens for influenza 
viruses; 2,807 (6.6%) were positive (Figure 1). Of 
these, 1,598 (57%) were influenza A viruses, and 
1,209 (43%) were influenza B viruses. A total of 805 
(50%) of the 1,598 influenza A viruses were subtyped; 
679 (84%) of these were influenza A (H3) viruses, 
and 126 (16%) were 2009 influenza A (H1) viruses. 
Influenza virus–positive tests have been reported from 
48 states and the District of Columbia and in all 10 
of the surveillance regions since October 3. However, 
of the 2,807 influenza positive tests reported to CDC 
so far this season, most (1,778 [63%]) have been 
reported from Region 4 (southeastern United States). 
Region 4 is the only region where influenza B viruses 
have been reported more frequently than influenza A 
viruses. Influenza B viruses from Region 4 account for 
1,034 (58%) of the influenza-positive tests reported 
from the region and 86% of all influenza B viruses 
reported for the country. 
Antigenic Characterization
WHO collaborating laboratories in the United 
States are requested to submit a subset of their 
influenza-positive respiratory specimens to CDC for 
further antigenic characterization. CDC has antigeni-
cally characterized 89 influenza viruses collected by 
U.S. laboratories during the 2010–11 season, includ-
ing 13 2009 influenza A (H1N1), 26 influenza A 
(H3N2), and 50 influenza B viruses. All viruses were 
antigenically related to the components included in 
the 2010–11 influenza vaccine: A/California/7/2009-
like (H1N1), A/Perth/16/2009-like (H3N2), and B/
Brisbane/60/2008-like. 
Antiviral Resistance of Influenza Virus 
Isolates
Since October 1, a total of 104 influenza viruses 
have been tested for antiviral resistance. Of the 17 
2009 influenza A (H1N1), 33 influenza A (H3N2), 
and 54 influenza B viruses tested, all were sensitive 
to both oseltamivir and zanamivir. 
Novel Influenza A Viruses 
Three cases of human infection with a novel influ-
enza A virus were reported during November and 
December, one each from Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, 
and Minnesota. Onset of the illnesses occurred in 
September, October, and November, respectively. 
All three patients were infected with swine-origin 
influenza A (H3N2) viruses. Two of the three cases 
occurred in adults, and the third occurred in a child. 
Two of the three patients were hospitalized; all three 
have fully recovered from their illness. The three cases 
are not related, and influenza viruses recovered from 
each of these cases were similar but not identical, 
indicating that they did not come from a common 
source. All three patients had either contact with swine 
or lived in areas close to swine farms. No evidence of 
human-to-human transmission of these viruses was 
identified in the first two cases, and investigation of 
the third case is ongoing.
Update: Influenza Activity — United States,  
October 3–December 11, 2010
* The CDC influenza surveillance system collects five categories of 
information from nine data sources: 1) viral surveillance (World 
Health Organization collaborating U.S. laboratories, the National 
Respiratory and Enteric Virus Surveillance System, and novel 
influenza A virus case reporting), 2) outpatient illness surveillance 
(U.S. Outpatient ILI Surveillance Network), 3) mortality (122 Cities 
Mortality Reporting System, Aggregate Hospitalization and Death 
Reporting Activity, and influenza-associated pediatric mortality 
reports), 4) hospitalizations (Emerging Infections Program and 
Aggregate Hospitalization and Death Reporting Activity), and 5) 
summary of geographic spread of influenza (state and territorial 
epidemiologist reports).
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State-Specific Activity Levels 
For the week ending December 11, influenza 
activity† was reported as regional in four states and 
Puerto Rico. Twenty states reported local activity, and 
21 additional states as well as the District of Columbia 
and U.S. Virgin Islands reported sporadic activity. 
Five states and Guam reported no influenza activity. 
No states have reported geographically widespread 
influenza activity to date for the 2010–11 influenza 
season.
Outpatient Influenza-Like Illness
Since October 3, the weekly percentage of out-
patient visits for influenza-like illness (ILI)§ reported 
by the approximately 1,500 U.S. Outpatient ILI 
Surveillance Network (ILINet) weekly reporters in 
50 states, New York City, Chicago, and the District 
of Columbia that comprise ILINet, has ranged from 
1.1% to 1.9%, which is below the national baseline 
of 2.5% (Figure 2). On a regional level, only Region 
4 has reported ILI at or above their respective region-
specific baseline, and that was for a single week that 
ended on November 27.¶ 
Data collected in ILINet also are used to produce 
a measure of ILI activity by state. Activity levels are 
based on the percentage of outpatient visits in a state 
for ILI and are compared to the average percentage of 
ILI visits that occur during spring and fall weeks with 
little or no influenza virus circulation. Activity levels 
range from minimal, which would correspond to 
ILI activity from outpatient clinics being at or below 
the average, to high, which would correspond to ILI 
activity from outpatient clinics being much higher 
than the average. Because the clinical definition of 
ILI is very general, not all ILI is caused by influenza; 
however, when combined with laboratory data, the 
information on ILI activity provides a clear picture 
of influenza activity in the United States.
Since October 3, only two states, Georgia and 
Alabama, have experienced high levels of ILI activity. 
No other state has reported a level of activity higher 
than low.
Aggregate Hospitalization and Death 
Reporting Activity (AHDRA)
The AHDRA system, which was implemented 
during the 2009 pandemic and has continued on 
a voluntary basis for the 2010–11 influenza sea-
son, tracks weekly counts of laboratory-confirmed 
influenza-associated hospitalizations and deaths. An 
FIGURE 1. Number* and percentage of respiratory speci-
mens testing positive for influenza reported by World 
Health Organization and National Respiratory and Enteric 
Virus Surveillance System collaborating laboratories, by 
type, subtype, and surveillance week — United States, 
October 3–December 11, 2010




































† Levels of activity are 1) no activity; 2) sporadic: isolated laboratory-
confirmed influenza cases or a laboratory-confirmed outbreak in 
one institution, with no increase in activity; 3) local: increased ILI, 
or at least two institutional outbreaks (ILI or laboratory-confirmed 
influenza) in one region with recent laboratory evidence of influenza 
in that region; virus activity no greater than sporadic in other regions; 
4) regional: increased ILI activity or institutional outbreaks (ILI 
or laboratory-confirmed influenza) in at least two but less than 
half of the regions in the state with recent laboratory evidence of 
influenza in those regions; and 5) widespread: increased ILI activity 
or institutional outbreaks (ILI or laboratory-confirmed influenza) in 
at least half the regions in the state, with recent laboratory evidence 
of influenza in the state.
§ Defined as a temperature of ≥100.0°F (≥37.8°C), oral or equivalent, 
and cough or sore throat, in the absence of a known cause other 
than influenza.
¶ The national and regional baselines are the mean percentage of visits 
for ILI during noninfluenza weeks for the previous three seasons 
plus two standard deviations. A noninfluenza week is a week during 
which <10% of specimens tested positive for influenza. National 
and regional percentages of patient visits for ILI are weighted on the 
basis of state population. Use of the national baseline for regional 
data is not appropriate.
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average of 24 jurisdictions have provided reports on 
laboratory-confirmed influenza-associated hospi-
talizations, and an average of 22 jurisdictions have 
provided reports on laboratory-confirmed influenza-
associated deaths per week this season. During 
October 3–December 11, a total of 497 laboratory-
confirmed influenza-associated hospitalizations and 
12 laboratory-confirmed influenza-associated deaths 
were reported to CDC.
Pneumonia- and Influenza-Related 
Mortality
For the week ending December 11, pneumonia 
and influenza (P&I) was reported as an underlying 
or contributing cause of death for 6.9% of all deaths 
reported to the 122-Cities Mortality Reporting 
System. This percentage is below the epidemic 
threshold of 7.3% for that week. During October 
3–December 11, the weekly percentage of deaths 
attributed to P&I ranged from 6.0% to 7.0%, remain-
ing below the epidemic threshold.**
Influenza-Related Pediatric Mortality
Two influenza-related pediatric deaths have been 
reported for the 2010–11 season, one each from Texas 
and New York. One death was associated with an 
influenza A (H3) virus and the other with an influenza 
A virus for which the subtype was not determined. 
Both children were aged <5 years and had bacterial 
coinfections, but no chronic medical conditions were 
reported.
FIGURE 2. Percentage of visits for influenza-like illness (ILI) reported by the U.S. Outpatient Influenza-Like Illness 
Surveillance Network (ILINet), by surveillance week — United States, September 30, 2007, through December 11, 2010
* The national baseline is the mean percentage of visits for ILI during noninfluenza weeks for the previous three seasons plus two standard 
deviations. A noninfluenza week is a week during which <10% of speciments tested positive for influenza. Use of the national baseline for 



















    
Surveillance week/year
% of visits for ILI
National baseline*
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 ** The seasonal baseline proportion of P&I deaths is projected using 
a robust regression procedure in which a periodic regression model 
is applied to the observed percentage of deaths from P&I that were 
reported by the 122 Cities Mortality Reporting System during 
the preceding 5 years. The epidemic threshold is 1.645 standard 
deviations above the seasonal baseline.
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Reported by
WHO Collaborating Center for Surveillance, Epide-
miology, and Control of Influenza. L Brammer, MPH, 
S Epperson, MPH, K Kniss, MPH, D Mustaquim, 
MPH, A Bishop, MPH, R Dhara, MPH, M Jhung, 
MD, T Wallis, MS, L Finelli, DrPH, L Gubareva, 
PhD, J Bresee, MD, A Klimov, PhD, N Cox, PhD, 
Influenza Div, National Center for Immunization and 
Respiratory Diseases.
Editorial Note
Influenza activity in the United States during 
October 3–December 11 was low overall, with cocir-
culation of influenza A (H3N2), 2009 A (H1N1), and 
B viruses. Regional differences in influenza activity 
have been noted, with the highest levels seen in the 
southeastern states, where influenza B viruses have 
predominated. Influenza activity likely will continue 
to increase in the weeks ahead. During the 2009–10 
season, as a result of pandemic 2009 influenza A 
(H1N1) circulation, influenza activity peaked unusu-
ally early (late October); however, during 22 of the 27 
influenza seasons before the 2009–10 season, influ-
enza activity peaked in January or later (1). Health-
care providers should offer influenza vaccination 
throughout the influenza season to protect as many 
persons as possible from influenza virus infection and 
its complications. 
Although influenza activity has been low 
nationwide, the first pediatric influenza-associated 
deaths of the 2010–11 season have been reported, 
and influenza-associated deaths also have been 
reported among adults through the AHDRA system. 
Health-care providers are reminded to consider 
influenza infection in the differential diagnosis of 
persons hospitalized with acute respiratory illness, 
including those with clinical or radiologically 
confirmed pneumonia. Influenza antiviral medication 
treatment is recommended for persons with suspected 
or laboratory-confirmed influenza illness who 1) 
are hospitalized; 2) have a severe, progressive, or 
complicated illness course; or 3) are at increased risk 
for influenza-related complications (e.g. persons with 
asthma, pregnant women, children aged <2 years, and 
adults aged ≥65 years) (2). If influenza diagnostic 
testing is performed, antiviral treatment should not 
be delayed pending test results because the benefit of 
antiviral treatment is greatest when started within the 
first 2 days of illness (2,3). Additional information 
regarding use of influenza antiviral medications is 
available online.††
Health-care providers should be alerted to the pos-
sibility of bacterial coinfection among children and 
adults with influenza and request bacterial cultures if 
pneumonia is suspected. Clinicians should be aware 
of the possibility of coinfection with Staphylococcus 
aureus (including methicillin-resistant strains) in per-
sons with influenza when choosing empiric antibiotic 
therapy for patients with suspected influenza-related 
pneumonia. In addition, health-care providers are 
asked to contact their local or state health depart-
ment as soon as possible when deaths associated 
with laboratory-confirmed influenza occur among 
children. 
Three human infections with swine-origin influ-
enza A (H3N2) virus have been identified since 
October, increasing the total number of detections of 
human infections with this virus to six during 2009 
and 2010. The increase in detection of this virus might 
have resulted, in part, from changes in testing methods 
implemented at state public health laboratories at the 
start of the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic to 
allow for detection of swine-origin influenza A viruses 
(4,5). Before the pandemic, recognition of swine-
origin influenza A (H3N2) virus infection in humans 
was possible only for the small subset of viruses for 
which detailed antigenic or genetic analysis was 
performed. The continued detection of transmission 
of influenza viruses from swine to humans and the 
earlier detections of outbreaks in swine herds resulting 
from the transmission of 2009 H1N1 infection from 
humans (6) illustrates the importance of continued 
influenza surveillance among both human and ani-
mal populations. Thorough investigations of all cases 
of novel influenza virus infections are important to 
rule out sustained human-to-human transmission. 
Clinical laboratories that identify viruses that cannot 
be subtyped should contact their state laboratories. 
State or local health departments are urged to contact 
CDC immediately if they detect an influenza virus 
thought to be of animal origin or any influenza A virus 
that cannot be subtyped with the influenza reagents 
currently available.
 †† Available at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals/antivirals.
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CDC continues year-round influenza surveillance 
to provide information needed to ensure up-to-date 
recommendations regarding prevention and treat-
ment of influenza. Influenza surveillance reports for 
the United States are posted online weekly during 
October–May and are available on the CDC web-
site.§§ Additional information regarding influenza 
viruses, surveillance, diagnosis, vaccine, and antiviral 
medications, and novel influenza A infections in 
humans also is available from CDC.¶¶
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Maternal & Child Health Epidemiology 
Capacity: Findings and Recommendations 
Available Online
The Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists 
(CSTE) has released a new report on state-based 
maternal and child health epidemiology capacity in 
the United States at http://www.cste.org/2009mcheca.
pdf. The report, Maternal & Child Health Epidemiology 
Capacity: Findings and Recommendations, updates find-
ings from the 2002 report (1), reports findings from 
the 2009 CSTE National Assessment of Epidemiology 
Capacity (2), and provides recommendations for 
improving capacity.
This assessment reports that maternal and child 
health (MCH) epidemiology and surveillance capacity 
continues to increase. Approximately 55% of jurisdic-
tions reported at least substantial MCH capacity, and 
the percentage of jurisdictions with minimal-to-no 
capacity progressively decreased to 12% in 2009. 
However, despite this trend, nearly half of states still 
lack substantial MCH capacity, citing additional staff 
as the most pressing need. Improving capacity in states 
that have minimal-to-no MCH epidemiology capac-
ity is a recommended priority. Another priority is the 
need to increase involvement of MCH epidemiolo-
gists in program-level decision making.
Additional information is available from CSTE by 
e-mail (atran@cste.org) or telephone (770-458-3811).
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National Folic Acid Awareness Week
January 2–8, 2010, is National Folic Acid 
Awareness Week. In 1998, the Institute of Medicine 
recommended that, to reduce their risk for a preg-
nancy affected by neural tube defects, women capable 
of becoming pregnant should take 400 micrograms 
of synthetic folic acid daily from fortified foods or 
supplements, or a combination of the two, in addi-
tion to consuming food folate from a varied diet (1). 
Health-care professionals should encourage every 
woman who can become pregnant to consume 400 
micrograms of folic acid daily. More information 
about folic acid, including free education materials 
and CDC activities, is available at http://www.cdc.
gov/folicacid. 
Reference
1. Institute of Medicine. Dietary reference intakes for thiamin, 
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QuickStats 
FROM THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS
Percentage of Adults Aged ≥65 Years Who Have Lost All Their Natural 
Teeth,* by Poverty Status† — National Health Interview Survey, 
United States, 1998–2009§
* Based on response to the question, “Have you lost all of your upper and lower natural (permanent) teeth?” In 
1998, separate questions were asked about upper and lower tooth loss. 
† Poverty status is based on family income and family size using the U.S. Census Bureau poverty thresholds. 
Family income was imputed when information was missing, using multiple imputation methodology.
§ Estimates are age adjusted using the projected 2000 U.S. population as the standard population and three age 
groups: 65–74 years, 75–84 years, and ≥85 years. Estimates are based on household interviews of a sample of 
the civilian, noninstitutionalized U.S. adult population and are presented as 3-year annual averages to increase 
reliability. 
During 1998–2009, the percentage of older adults who had no natural teeth was higher among those in families with low income 
than in families with higher income. Among all income groups, the prevalence of no natural teeth was lower during 2007–2009 
(25.3%) than during 1998–2000 (31.0%). 
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TABLE I. Provisional cases of infrequently reported notifiable diseases (<1,000 cases reported during the preceding year) — United States, week ending 









Total cases reported 
for previous years States reporting cases 
during current week (No.)2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Anthrax — — 0 1 — 1 1 —
Botulism, total — 97 4 118 145 144 165 135
foodborne — 6 1 10 17 32 20 19
infant — 68 3 83 109 85 97 85
other (wound and unspecified) — 23 1 25 19 27 48 31
Brucellosis 1 118 3 115 80 131 121 120 CA (1)
Chancroid — 35 1 28 25 23 33 17
Cholera — 8 0 10 5 7 9 8
Cyclosporiasis§ 1 166 2 141 139 93 137 543 FL (1)
Diphtheria — — — — — — — —
Domestic arboviral diseases § ,¶:
California serogroup virus disease — 71 0 55 62 55 67 80
Eastern equine encephalitis virus disease — 10 — 4 4 4 8 21
Powassan virus disease — 5 — 6 2 7 1 1
St. Louis encephalitis virus disease — 8 0 12 13 9 10 13
Western equine encephalitis virus disease — — — — — — — —
Haemophilus influenzae,** invasive disease (age <5 yrs):
serotype b 1 16 1 35 30 22 29 9 NM (1)
nonserotype b 1 148 6 236 244 199 175 135 AL (1)
unknown serotype 2 243 5 178 163 180 179 217 ND (1), MD (1)
Hansen disease§ — 57 2 103 80 101 66 87
Hantavirus pulmonary syndrome§ — 17 1 20 18 32 40 26
Hemolytic uremic syndrome, postdiarrheal§ 2 216 8 242 330 292 288 221 CA (2)
HIV infection, pediatric (age <13 yrs)†† — — 3 — — — — 380
Influenza-associated pediatric mortality§,§§ — 59 2 358 90 77 43 45
Listeriosis 3 730 21 851 759 808 884 896 FL (1), CA (2)
Measles¶¶ — 59 1 71 140 43 55 66
Meningococcal disease, invasive***:
A, C, Y, and W-135 — 224 7 301 330 325 318 297
serogroup B 1 103 5 174 188 167 193 156 WA (1)
other serogroup — 9 1 23 38 35 32 27
unknown serogroup 5 388 14 482 616 550 651 765 OH (1), MO (1), FL (1), AL (1), CA (1)
Mumps 5 2,515 70 1,991 454 800 6,584 314 ND (1), TX (3), CA (1)
Novel influenza A virus infections††† — 4 0 43,774 2 4 NN NN
Plague — 2 0 8 3 7 17 8
Poliomyelitis, paralytic — — 0 1 — — — 1
Polio virus Infection, nonparalytic§ — — — — — — NN NN
Psittacosis§ — 4 0 9 8 12 21 16
Q fever, total§,§§§ — 112 3 114 120 171 169 136
acute — 86 2 94 106 — — —
chronic — 26 0 20 14 — — —
Rabies, human — 1 0 4 2 1 3 2
Rubella¶¶¶ — 6 0 3 16 12 11 11
Rubella, congenital syndrome — — — 2 — — 1 1
SARS-CoV§,**** — — — — — — — —
Smallpox§ — — — — — — — —
Streptococcal toxic-shock syndrome§ 1 152 4 161 157 132 125 129 NY (1)
Syphilis, congenital (age <1 yr)†††† — 206 8 423 431 430 349 329
Tetanus — 8 1 18 19 28 41 27
Toxic-shock syndrome (staphylococcal)§ 1 71 3 74 71 92 101 90 MO (1)
Trichinellosis — 4 0 13 39 5 15 16
Tularemia — 105 2 93 123 137 95 154
Typhoid fever 3 391 8 397 449 434 353 324 NC (1), CA (2)
Vancomycin-intermediate Staphylococcus aureus§ — 85 1 78 63 37 6 2
Vancomycin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus§ — 1 0 1 — 2 1 3
Vibriosis (noncholera Vibrio species infections)§ 6 741 7 789 588 549 NN NN OH (1), NC (1), FL (1), WA (1), CA (2)
Viral hemorrhagic fever§§§§ — 1 — NN NN NN NN NN
Yellow fever — — — — — — — —
See Table I footnotes on next page.
Notifiable Diseases and Mortality Tables
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Notifiable Disease Data Team and 122 Cities Mortality Data Team
 Patsy A. Hall-Baker
Deborah A. Adams  Rosaline Dhara
Willie J. Anderson  Pearl C. Sharp
Michael S. Wodajo  Lenee Blanton
* Ratio of current 4-week total to mean of 15 4-week totals (from previous, comparable, and subsequent 4-week periods for the 
past 5 years). The point where the hatched area begins is based on the mean and two standard deviations of these 4-week 
totals.
FIGURE I. Selected notifiable disease reports, United States, comparison of provisional 4-week 


























TABLE I. (Continued) Provisional cases of infrequently reported notifiable diseases (<1,000 cases reported during the preceding year) — United States, week 
ending December 18, 2010 (50th week)*
—: No reported cases. N: Not reportable. NN: Not Nationally Notifiable Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.
 * Case counts for reporting year 2010 are provisional and subject to change. For further information on interpretation of these data, see http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/phs/files/
ProvisionalNationa%20NotifiableDiseasesSurveillanceData20100927.pdf.
 † Calculated by summing the incidence counts for the current week, the 2 weeks preceding the current week, and the 2 weeks following the current week, for a total of 5 preceding years. 
Additional information is available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/phs/files/5yearweeklyaverage.pdf.
 § Not reportable in all states. Data from states where the condition is not reportable are excluded from this table except starting in 2007 for the domestic arboviral diseases, STD data, TB 
data, and influenza-associated pediatric mortality, and in 2003 for SARS-CoV. Reporting exceptions are available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/phs/infdis.htm.
 ¶ Includes both neuroinvasive and nonneuroinvasive. Updated weekly from reports to the Division of Vector-Borne Infectious Diseases, National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and 
Enteric Diseases (ArboNET Surveillance). Data for West Nile virus are available in Table II.
 ** Data for H. influenzae (all ages, all serotypes) are available in Table II.
 †† Updated monthly from reports to the Division of HIV/AIDS Prevention, National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention. Implementation of HIV reporting influences 
the number of cases reported. Updates of pediatric HIV data have been temporarily suspended until upgrading of the national HIV/AIDS surveillance data management system is 
completed. Data for HIV/AIDS, when available, are displayed in Table IV, which appears quarterly.
 §§ Updated weekly from reports to the Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases. Since October 3, 2010, two influenza-associated pediatric deaths 
occurred during the 2010–11 influenza season. Since August 30, 2009, a total of 282 influenza-associated pediatric deaths occurring during the 2009–10 influenza season have been 
reported. 
 ¶¶ No measles cases were reported for the current week.
 *** Data for meningococcal disease (all serogroups) are available in Table II.
 ††† CDC discontinued reporting of individual confirmed and probable cases of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus infections on July 24, 2009. During 2009, four cases of human 
infection with novel influenza A viruses, different from the 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) strain, were reported to CDC. The three cases of novel influenza A virus infection reported 
to CDC during 2010 were identified as swine influenza A (H3N2) virus and are unrelated to the 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus. Total case counts for 2009 were provided by the 
Influenza Division, National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD).
 §§§ In 2009, Q fever acute and chronic reporting categories were recognized as a result of revisions to the Q fever case definition. Prior to that time, case counts were not differentiated with 
respect to acute and chronic Q fever cases.
 ¶¶¶ No rubella cases were reported for the current week.
 **** Updated weekly from reports to the Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases, National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases.
 †††† Updated weekly from reports to the Division of STD Prevention, National Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention.
 §§§§ There was one case of viral hemorrhagic fever reported during week 12. The one case report was confirmed as lassa fever. See Table II for dengue hemorrhagic fever.
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TABLE II. Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending December 18, 2010, and December 19, 2009 (50th week)*
Reporting area
Chlamydia trachomatis infection Cryptosporidiosis
Current  
week






Previous 52 weeks Cum  
2010
Cum  
2009Med Max Med Max
United States 10,376 23,888 26,354 1,157,633 1,201,487 43 120 342 7,348 7,131
New England 574 759 1,396 38,406 38,888 — 7 77 435 441
Connecticut — 187 736 9,585 11,212 — 0 71 71 38
Maine† — 49 69 1,996 2,356 — 1 7 74 50
Massachusetts 448 401 695 19,896 18,601 — 3 8 156 173
New Hampshire 68 46 114 2,415 2,053 — 1 5 52 81
Rhode Island† 19 66 120 3,312 3,508 — 0 2 13 22
Vermont† 39 23 51 1,202 1,158 — 1 5 69 77
Mid. Atlantic 1,416 3,372 5,045 162,824 152,190 7 15 38 815 797
New Jersey — 516 691 25,340 23,440 — 0 4 37 53
New York (Upstate) 709 696 2,530 33,764 30,420 4 3 16 209 206
New York City — 1,209 2,738 57,635 56,707 — 2 6 98 80
Pennsylvania 707 943 1,092 46,085 41,623 3 8 26 471 458
E.N. Central 822 3,491 3,971 169,768 192,399 7 30 122 1,939 1,680
Illinois 23 745 1,182 36,918 59,119 — 4 21 265 151
Indiana — 357 797 18,311 21,289 — 3 10 143 277
Michigan 539 930 1,419 46,790 44,609 1 5 18 311 279
Ohio 134 995 1,101 47,102 47,010 6 7 24 443 375
Wisconsin 126 426 513 20,647 20,372 — 9 57 777 598
W.N. Central 499 1,371 1,556 66,280 68,415 1 22 83 1,258 1,069
Iowa 8 202 270 9,859 9,146 — 4 24 326 204
Kansas 26 189 235 9,174 10,272 — 2 9 130 101
Minnesota — 283 345 12,925 13,872 — 0 16 98 325
Missouri 377 503 620 25,111 25,095 — 4 30 359 181
Nebraska† 88 94 173 4,663 5,267 1 3 26 227 116
North Dakota — 30 89 1,622 1,852 — 0 18 31 13
South Dakota — 62 77 2,926 2,911 — 1 6 87 129
S. Atlantic 3,691 4,725 5,664 233,537 243,183 11 18 51 987 1,102
Delaware 91 84 220 4,271 4,529 — 0 1 8 12
District of Columbia — 94 177 4,570 6,449 — 0 1 7 7
Florida 707 1,464 1,738 71,845 70,928 4 7 19 373 442
Georgia 418 628 1,217 31,325 38,563 2 5 31 287 332
Maryland† 290 453 710 22,401 22,829 — 1 3 35 42
North Carolina 676 756 1,563 38,667 40,000 4 0 12 82 112
South Carolina† 846 529 748 26,676 25,967 1 1 8 88 59
Virginia† 663 596 902 30,145 30,387 — 2 8 91 80
West Virginia — 73 117 3,637 3,531 — 0 3 16 16
E.S. Central 169 1,746 2,414 83,126 90,645 2 5 19 316 223
Alabama† — 505 757 24,827 25,311 1 2 13 158 64
Kentucky 169 264 614 13,574 13,166 — 1 6 82 65
Mississippi — 384 780 18,404 23,133 — 0 3 22 18
Tennessee† — 563 783 26,321 29,035 1 1 5 54 76
W.S. Central 803 3,007 4,578 151,956 156,470 6 7 39 440 556
Arkansas† 272 275 392 12,101 14,032 — 0 3 31 57
Louisiana 428 322 1,073 16,308 26,808 — 1 6 64 55
Oklahoma 103 257 1,374 14,125 13,680 3 1 8 83 123
Texas† — 2,241 3,194 109,422 101,950 3 5 30 262 321
Mountain 593 1,450 1,912 72,629 77,279 4 10 29 533 549
Arizona 326 513 713 24,958 24,850 — 1 3 34 33
Colorado 75 348 560 16,426 19,275 — 2 8 130 134
Idaho† 135 69 200 3,936 3,645 4 2 7 93 96
Montana† 29 61 82 2,947 2,895 — 1 4 48 56
Nevada† — 173 329 8,818 9,810 — 0 6 31 25
New Mexico† — 162 453 7,650 8,912 — 2 12 117 141
Utah — 121 176 5,933 5,974 — 1 5 64 39
Wyoming† 28 38 81 1,961 1,918 — 0 2 16 25
Pacific 1,809 3,648 5,350 179,107 182,018 5 12 28 625 714
Alaska 41 113 148 5,398 5,023 — 0 1 5 7
California 1,273 2,784 4,406 136,619 139,477 3 7 18 361 436
Hawaii — 112 158 5,488 5,879 — 0 1 1 1
Oregon 193 214 468 11,222 10,815 1 3 13 175 183
Washington 302 406 661 20,380 20,824 1 1 8 83 87
Territories
American Samoa — 0 0 — — N 0 0 N N
C.N.M.I. — — — — — — — — — —
Guam — 8 31 323 331 — 0 0 — —
Puerto Rico — 92 265 4,950 7,151 N 0 0 N N
U.S. Virgin Islands — 11 29 548 482 — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable.   —: No reported cases.   N: Not reportable.   NN: Not Nationally Notifiable.   Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.   Med: Median.   Max: Maximum.
* Case counts for reporting year 2010 are provisional and subject to change. For further information on interpretation of these data, see http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/phs/files/
ProvisionalNationa%20NotifiableDiseasesSurveillanceData20100927.pdf. Data for HIV/AIDS, AIDS and TB, when available, are displayed in Table IV, which appears quarterly.
† Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
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TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending December 18, 2010, and December 19, 2009 (50th week)*
Dengue Virus Infection
Reporting area
Dengue Fever† Dengue Hemorrhagic Fever§
Current  
week






Previous 52 weeks Cum  
2010
Cum  
2009Med Max Med Max
United States — 6 36 469 NN — 0 2 5 NN
New England — 0 3 9 NN — 0 0 — NN
Connecticut — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Maine¶ — 0 2 6 NN — 0 0 — NN
Massachusetts — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
New Hampshire — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Rhode Island¶ — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Vermont¶ — 0 1 3 NN — 0 0 — NN
Mid. Atlantic — 2 12 134 NN — 0 1 1 NN
New Jersey — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
New York (Upstate) — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
New York City — 1 12 115 NN — 0 1 1 NN
Pennsylvania — 0 2 19 NN — 0 0 — NN
E.N. Central — 0 5 41 NN — 0 1 1 NN
Illinois — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Indiana — 0 2 11 NN — 0 0 — NN
Michigan — 0 2 9 NN — 0 0 — NN
Ohio — 0 2 16 NN — 0 0 — NN
Wisconsin — 0 2 5 NN — 0 1 1 NN
W.N. Central — 0 2 17 NN — 0 0 — NN
Iowa — 0 1 2 NN — 0 0 — NN
Kansas — 0 1 1 NN — 0 0 — NN
Minnesota — 0 2 13 NN — 0 0 — NN
Missouri — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Nebraska¶ — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
North Dakota — 0 1 1 NN — 0 0 — NN
South Dakota — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
S. Atlantic — 2 17 216 NN — 0 1 2 NN
Delaware — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
District of Columbia — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Florida — 2 14 176 NN — 0 1 2 NN
Georgia — 0 2 11 NN — 0 0 — NN
Maryland¶ — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
North Carolina — 0 1 4 NN — 0 0 — NN
South Carolina¶ — 0 3 10 NN — 0 0 — NN
Virginia¶ — 0 3 13 NN — 0 0 — NN
West Virginia — 0 1 2 NN — 0 0 — NN
E.S. Central — 0 2 7 NN — 0 0 — NN
Alabama¶ — 0 2 4 NN — 0 0 — NN
Kentucky — 0 1 1 NN — 0 0 — NN
Mississippi — 0 1 1 NN — 0 0 — NN
Tennessee¶ — 0 1 1 NN — 0 0 — NN
W.S. Central — 0 1 4 NN — 0 1 1 NN
Arkansas¶ — 0 0 — NN — 0 1 1 NN
Louisiana — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Oklahoma — 0 1 4 NN — 0 0 — NN
Texas¶ — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Mountain — 0 2 17 NN — 0 0 — NN
Arizona — 0 1 6 NN — 0 0 — NN
Colorado — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Idaho¶ — 0 1 3 NN — 0 0 — NN
Montana¶ — 0 1 3 NN — 0 0 — NN
Nevada¶ — 0 1 4 NN — 0 0 — NN
New Mexico¶ — 0 1 1 NN — 0 0 — NN
Utah — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Wyoming¶ — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Pacific — 0 5 24 NN — 0 0 — NN
Alaska — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
California — 0 5 11 NN — 0 0 — NN
Hawaii — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Oregon — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Washington — 0 2 13 NN — 0 0 — NN
Territories
American Samoa — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
C.N.M.I. — — — — NN — — — — NN
Guam — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
Puerto Rico — 109 536 9,865 NN — 1 3 49 NN
U.S. Virgin Islands — 0 0 — NN — 0 0 — NN
C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable.   —: No reported cases.   N: Not reportable.   NN: Not Nationally Notifiable.   Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.   Med: Median.   Max: Maximum.
* Case counts for reporting year 2010 are provisional and subject to change. For further information on interpretation of these data, see http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/phs/files/
ProvisionalNationa%20NotifiableDiseasesSurveillanceData20100927.pdf. Data for HIV/AIDS, AIDS and TB, when available, are displayed in Table IV, which appears quarterly.
† Dengue Fever includes cases that meet criteria for Dengue Fever with hemorrhage, other clinical, and unknown case classifications. 
§ DHF includes cases that meet criteria for dengue shock syndrome (DSS), a more severe form of DHF.
¶ Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
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TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending December 18, 2010, and December 19, 2009 (50th week)*
Ehrlichiosis/Anaplasmosis†
Reporting area
Ehrlichia chaffeensis Anaplasma phagocytophilum Undetermined
Current 
week












Previous 52 weeks Cum 
2010
Cum 
2009Med Max Med Max Med Max
United States 1 8 181 584 916 6 11 309 781 939 1 1 35 101 167
New England — 0 1 7 54 — 1 8 84 270 — 0 2 8 2
Connecticut — 0 0 — — — 0 5 26 17 — 0 2 6 —
Maine§ — 0 1 4 6 — 0 2 16 15 — 0 0 — —
Massachusetts — 0 0 — 9 — 0 1 — 98 — 0 0 — —
New Hampshire — 0 1 3 4 — 0 3 18 19 — 0 1 2 1
Rhode Island§ — 0 1 — 34 — 0 7 24 121 — 0 0 — 1
Vermont§ — 0 0 — 1 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Mid. Atlantic — 1 15 50 193 5 3 17 216 305 1 0 2 5 46
New Jersey — 0 1 — 101 — 0 1 1 70 — 0 0 — —
New York (Upstate) — 0 15 29 55 5 3 17 212 224 1 0 1 5 7
New York City — 0 3 20 10 — 0 1 3 9 — 0 0 — 1
Pennsylvania — 0 1 1 27 — 0 0 — 2 — 0 1 — 38
E.N. Central — 0 4 32 85 1 4 39 379 281 — 1 7 62 71
Illinois — 0 2 12 33 — 0 2 7 6 — 0 2 3 3
Indiana — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 3 28 36
Michigan — 0 1 2 6 — 0 0 — — — 0 1 4 —
Ohio — 0 3 6 14 — 0 1 2 1 — 0 0 — 2
Wisconsin — 0 1 12 32 1 4 39 370 274 — 0 4 27 30
W.N. Central — 1 13 126 154 — 0 261 16 59 — 0 30 11 21
Iowa — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Kansas — 0 1 6 6 — 0 0 — 1 — 0 0 — —
Minnesota — 0 6 — 2 — 0 261 — 52 — 0 30 — 8
Missouri — 1 13 118 144 — 0 3 16 5 — 0 3 11 13
Nebraska§ — 0 1 2 2 — 0 0 — 1 — 0 0 — —
North Dakota — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
South Dakota — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
S. Atlantic — 4 19 251 261 — 1 7 61 17 — 0 2 7 2
Delaware — 0 3 17 22 — 0 1 4 2 — 0 0 — —
District of Columbia — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Florida — 0 2 8 12 — 0 1 3 3 — 0 0 — —
Georgia — 0 4 22 18 — 0 1 2 1 — 0 1 1 —
Maryland§ — 0 3 24 44 — 0 2 15 4 — 0 2 3 —
North Carolina — 2 13 103 64 — 0 4 25 3 — 0 0 — —
South Carolina§ — 0 2 4 12 — 0 1 1 — — 0 0 — —
Virginia§ — 1 13 72 88 — 0 2 11 4 — 0 1 3 2
West Virginia — 0 1 1 1 — 0 0 — — — 0 1 — —
E.S. Central — 0 10 86 136 — 0 2 18 3 — 0 1 7 24
Alabama§ — 0 3 11 9 — 0 2 7 1 — 0 0 — —
Kentucky — 0 2 16 12 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Mississippi — 0 1 3 6 — 0 1 1 — — 0 0 — —
Tennessee§ — 0 6 56 109 — 0 2 10 2 — 0 1 7 24
W.S. Central — 0 141 30 30 — 0 23 7 2 — 0 1 1 —
Arkansas§ — 0 34 11 4 — 0 6 3 — — 0 0 — —
Louisiana — 0 1 1 — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Oklahoma — 0 105 15 24 — 0 16 2 1 — 0 0 — —
Texas§ — 0 2 3 2 — 0 1 2 1 — 0 1 1 —
Mountain — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — 1
Arizona — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — 1
Colorado — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Idaho§ — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Montana§ — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Nevada§ — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
New Mexico§ — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Utah — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Wyoming§ — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Pacific 1 0 1 2 3 — 0 0 — 2 — 0 1 — —
Alaska — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
California 1 0 1 2 3 — 0 0 — 2 — 0 1 — —
Hawaii — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Oregon — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Washington — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Territories
American Samoa — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Guam — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Puerto Rico — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
U.S. Virgin Islands — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable.   —: No reported cases.   N: Not reportable.   NN: Not Nationally Notifiable.   Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.   Med: Median.   Max: Maximum.
* Case counts for reporting year 2010 are provisional and subject to change. For further information on interpretation of these data, see http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/phs/files/
ProvisionalNationa%20NotifiableDiseasesSurveillanceData20100927.pdf. Data for HIV/AIDS, AIDS and TB, when available, are displayed in Table IV, which appears quarterly.
† Cumulative total E. ewingii cases reported for year 2010 = 10.
§ Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
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TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending December 18, 2010, and December 19, 2009 (50th week)*
Reporting area
Giardiasis Gonorrhea
Haemophilus influenzae, invasive†  
All ages, all serotypes
Current 
week












Previous 52 weeks Cum 
2010
Cum 
2009Med Max Med Max Med Max
United States 195 329 666 17,111 18,403 2,582 5,546 6,386 271,484 291,881 34 59 171 2,810 2,787
New England 6 32 54 1,510 1,699 56 101 196 5,161 4,898 2 4 21 182 192
Connecticut — 5 13 236 280 — 41 169 2,214 2,398 — 0 15 44 49
Maine§ 5 4 12 226 213 — 3 11 136 133 — 0 2 13 19
Massachusetts — 13 24 670 727 45 47 81 2,331 1,894 — 2 5 89 96
New Hampshire — 3 8 138 193 1 3 7 152 108 — 0 2 11 13
Rhode Island§ — 1 7 60 70 2 5 14 271 317 — 0 2 11 10
Vermont§ 1 4 10 180 216 8 0 17 57 48 2 0 3 14 5
Mid. Atlantic 27 61 106 3,091 3,328 286 683 1,162 34,639 30,539 6 11 34 555 556
New Jersey — 6 18 331 419 — 111 175 5,615 4,643 — 2 7 87 122
New York (Upstate) 19 22 84 1,139 1,287 97 108 422 5,593 5,573 3 3 20 154 151
New York City 5 17 33 883 805 — 228 528 11,058 10,617 — 2 6 107 70
Pennsylvania 3 14 27 738 817 189 252 366 12,373 9,706 3 4 9 207 213
E.N. Central 29 54 83 2,738 2,823 297 943 1,231 46,665 61,245 3 10 20 469 441
Illinois — 12 26 545 593 4 188 360 8,789 19,499 — 3 9 151 167
Indiana — 4 14 207 300 — 99 222 5,183 6,706 — 1 6 76 80
Michigan 4 13 25 661 647 204 249 471 12,936 14,394 — 0 3 33 24
Ohio 24 17 29 845 783 55 318 381 15,126 15,589 3 2 6 118 97
Wisconsin 1 8 32 480 500 34 93 155 4,631 5,057 — 2 5 91 73
W.N. Central 13 24 165 1,355 1,796 146 282 348 13,899 14,425 3 3 24 164 155
Iowa 2 5 11 272 285 4 33 57 1,702 1,617 — 0 1 1 —
Kansas — 4 10 201 158 7 37 62 1,927 2,457 — 0 2 17 13
Minnesota — 0 135 136 539 — 37 62 1,820 2,246 — 0 17 25 54
Missouri 5 8 26 423 509 103 139 181 6,822 6,293 1 2 6 83 58
Nebraska§ 3 4 9 212 169 32 22 48 1,106 1,335 1 0 3 26 24
North Dakota 3 0 7 32 25 — 2 11 106 145 1 0 4 12 6
South Dakota — 1 7 79 111 — 7 19 416 332 — 0 0 — —
S. Atlantic 60 71 143 3,532 3,585 1,055 1,347 1,791 67,580 72,870 10 14 26 731 765
Delaware — 0 5 31 27 24 18 48 957 924 — 0 1 5 5
District of Columbia — 1 5 39 71 — 34 66 1,705 2,533 — 0 1 5 6
Florida 48 40 87 2,071 1,870 208 392 493 19,352 20,308 6 3 9 185 217
Georgia — 8 51 485 726 144 212 392 10,434 13,253 1 3 9 167 153
Maryland§ 4 5 11 255 269 50 132 214 6,473 6,147 2 1 5 66 90
North Carolina N 0 0 N N 212 242 596 12,941 13,584 1 2 9 119 103
South Carolina§ 4 2 9 137 105 265 152 232 7,897 8,120 — 2 7 75 76
Virginia§ 4 9 36 468 463 152 152 223 7,275 7,532 — 2 4 79 86
West Virginia — 0 6 46 54 — 10 26 546 469 — 0 5 30 29
E.S. Central 1 5 15 269 408 54 468 697 22,659 25,975 4 3 12 169 165
Alabama§ 1 4 11 212 195 — 147 217 7,233 7,293 1 0 3 28 40
Kentucky N 0 0 N N 54 72 142 3,535 3,795 1 1 3 35 21
Mississippi N 0 0 N N — 111 216 5,303 7,141 — 0 2 14 8
Tennessee§ — 1 9 57 213 — 134 194 6,588 7,746 2 2 10 92 96
W.S. Central 3 8 14 361 507 303 834 1,303 41,517 45,730 2 2 20 128 123
Arkansas§ 3 2 7 129 148 129 77 133 3,753 4,373 — 0 3 16 21
Louisiana — 3 8 169 199 139 93 351 4,812 8,718 — 0 4 24 23
Oklahoma — 1 7 63 160 35 76 359 4,147 4,338 2 1 15 80 73
Texas§ N 0 0 N N — 590 964 28,805 28,301 — 0 1 8 6
Mountain 16 30 51 1,574 1,605 66 175 244 8,581 9,087 2 5 15 281 241
Arizona — 3 8 150 196 44 62 109 2,942 3,073 — 2 10 102 79
Colorado 12 13 27 668 487 6 52 95 2,558 2,708 1 1 5 80 68
Idaho§ 3 4 9 203 203 14 2 13 138 103 — 0 2 18 4
Montana§ 1 2 7 100 130 1 2 6 98 76 — 0 1 2 1
Nevada§ — 1 11 97 106 — 29 94 1,523 1,688 — 0 2 10 18
New Mexico§ — 2 5 98 111 — 21 41 1,005 1,031 1 1 5 41 34
Utah — 4 11 222 301 — 5 15 282 334 — 0 4 22 34
Wyoming§ — 1 5 36 71 1 0 4 35 74 — 0 2 6 3
Pacific 40 53 133 2,681 2,652 319 609 815 30,783 27,112 2 2 21 131 149
Alaska 1 1 6 91 110 6 24 37 1,160 962 2 0 2 23 21
California 26 33 57 1,654 1,738 260 497 691 25,225 22,255 — 0 18 23 41
Hawaii — 0 4 34 20 — 14 26 710 616 — 0 2 10 30
Oregon 3 9 20 463 398 5 20 42 974 1,061 — 1 5 67 52
Washington 10 8 75 439 386 48 53 83 2,714 2,218 — 0 4 8 5
Territories
American Samoa — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Guam — 0 1 2 3 — 0 5 40 19 — 0 0 — —
Puerto Rico — 1 8 65 154 — 5 14 274 230 — 0 1 1 4
U.S. Virgin Islands — 0 0 — — — 2 7 131 115 — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable.   —: No reported cases.   N: Not reportable.   NN: Not Nationally Notifiable.   Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.   Med: Median.   Max: Maximum.
* Case counts for reporting year 2010 are provisional and subject to change. For further information on interpretation of these data, see http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/phs/files/
ProvisionalNationa%20NotifiableDiseasesSurveillanceData20100927.pdf. Data for HIV/AIDS, AIDS and TB, when available, are displayed in Table IV, which appears quarterly.
† Data for H. influenzae (age <5 yrs for serotype b, nonserotype b, and unknown serotype) are available in Table I.
§ Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
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TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending December 18, 2010, and December 19, 2009 (50th week)*

















Previous 52 weeks Cum 
2010
Cum 
2009Med Max Med Max Med Max
United States 13 30 69 1,471 1,885 35 62 204 2,976 3,150 5 14 44 793 725
New England — 2 5 89 104 — 1 5 50 53 — 1 4 41 65
Connecticut — 0 3 28 18 — 0 2 19 16 — 0 4 27 52
Maine† — 0 1 7 1 — 0 2 13 15 — 0 0 — 2
Massachusetts — 1 5 44 68 — 0 2 9 17 — 0 2 12 10
New Hampshire — 0 1 2 7 — 0 2 7 5 N 0 0 N N
Rhode Island† — 0 4 8 8 U 0 0 U U U 0 0 U U
Vermont† — 0 0 — 2 — 0 1 2 — — 0 1 2 1
Mid. Atlantic 1 4 10 198 262 3 5 10 271 318 1 2 6 105 95
New Jersey — 0 3 14 65 — 1 5 66 93 — 0 2 15 7
New York (Upstate) 1 1 4 58 44 2 1 6 54 51 1 1 4 58 45
New York City — 1 5 74 87 — 1 4 79 70 — 0 1 1 5
Pennsylvania — 1 4 52 66 1 1 5 72 104 — 0 3 31 38
E.N. Central 1 4 9 206 280 — 9 17 443 423 — 2 8 121 88
Illinois — 1 3 46 123 — 2 5 88 115 — 0 1 2 6
Indiana — 0 2 17 17 — 1 5 51 72 — 0 2 23 20
Michigan — 1 5 70 72 — 3 6 123 127 — 1 5 80 33
Ohio 1 1 5 47 36 — 2 6 87 86 — 0 1 8 26
Wisconsin — 0 3 26 32 — 2 8 94 23 — 0 2 8 3
W.N. Central — 1 13 76 115 — 2 15 116 137 — 0 11 25 22
Iowa — 0 3 11 36 — 0 2 14 36 — 0 1 — 10
Kansas — 0 2 11 12 — 0 2 10 6 — 0 2 3 1
Minnesota — 0 12 15 21 — 0 13 8 25 — 0 9 12 6
Missouri — 0 2 23 21 — 1 3 71 44 — 0 2 8 —
Nebraska† — 0 4 12 21 — 0 2 12 22 — 0 1 2 3
North Dakota — 0 3 3 1 — 0 0 — — — 0 1 — 1
South Dakota — 0 1 1 3 — 0 1 1 4 — 0 0 — 1
S. Atlantic 8 7 14 339 410 16 16 40 846 861 — 4 7 168 169
Delaware — 0 1 7 4 — 0 2 23 33 U 0 0 U U
District of Columbia — 0 1 1 1 — 0 1 3 10 — 0 1 2 1
Florida 6 3 7 141 165 8 6 11 293 289 — 1 5 55 51
Georgia — 1 3 38 50 1 3 7 144 140 — 0 2 11 31
Maryland† 1 0 3 24 45 — 1 6 72 71 — 0 3 28 23
North Carolina — 0 5 47 40 7 1 16 101 101 — 1 3 42 22
South Carolina† — 0 3 24 61 — 1 4 54 53 — 0 1 1 1
Virginia† 1 1 6 49 39 — 2 14 94 94 — 0 2 12 10
West Virginia — 0 5 8 5 — 0 14 62 70 — 0 5 17 30
E.S. Central — 1 5 45 43 7 8 13 354 338 1 3 8 151 101
Alabama† — 0 2 8 11 — 1 4 63 87 — 0 1 6 9
Kentucky — 0 5 23 12 5 2 8 129 88 1 2 6 104 61
Mississippi — 0 1 2 9 — 1 3 35 32 U 0 0 U U
Tennessee† — 0 2 12 11 2 2 8 127 131 — 1 4 41 31
W.S. Central — 3 19 136 187 7 9 109 473 562 2 1 14 73 59
Arkansas† — 0 1 2 12 — 0 4 41 62 — 0 0 — 2
Louisiana — 0 2 12 6 1 1 3 46 71 — 0 1 9 8
Oklahoma — 0 1 1 6 4 2 19 94 101 1 0 12 33 14
Texas† — 2 18 121 163 2 5 87 292 328 1 0 3 31 35
Mountain — 3 8 137 159 — 3 8 131 129 1 1 5 52 52
Arizona — 1 5 60 66 — 0 2 30 41 U 0 0 U U
Colorado — 1 3 35 50 — 0 5 40 26 — 0 1 12 27
Idaho† — 0 2 7 5 — 0 1 6 11 1 0 2 11 7
Montana† — 0 1 4 6 — 0 1 1 1 — 0 1 2 1
Nevada† — 0 2 14 15 — 0 3 38 34 — 0 1 6 5
New Mexico† — 0 1 5 8 — 0 1 5 7 — 0 2 11 6
Utah — 0 1 9 7 — 0 1 8 5 — 0 2 10 6
Wyoming† — 0 3 3 2 — 0 1 3 4 — 0 0 — —
Pacific 3 5 17 245 325 2 6 20 292 329 — 1 6 57 74
Alaska — 0 1 4 2 — 0 1 4 4 U 0 0 U U
California 3 4 16 200 257 2 4 16 203 232 — 0 4 23 42
Hawaii — 0 2 4 9 — 0 1 3 6 U 0 0 U U
Oregon — 0 2 17 17 — 1 3 38 44 — 0 3 15 17
Washington — 0 2 20 40 — 1 4 44 43 — 0 6 19 15
Territories
American Samoa — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Guam — 0 6 22 7 — 1 6 43 57 — 0 7 37 49
Puerto Rico — 0 2 14 21 — 0 2 18 34 — 0 0 — —
U.S. Virgin Islands — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable.   —: No reported cases.   N: Not reportable.   NN: Not Nationally Notifiable.   Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.   Med: Median.   Max: Maximum.
* Case counts for reporting year 2010 are provisional and subject to change. For further information on interpretation of these data, see http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/phs/files/
ProvisionalNationa%20NotifiableDiseasesSurveillanceData20100927.pdf. Data for HIV/AIDS, AIDS and TB, when available, are displayed in Table IV, which appears quarterly.
† Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
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TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending December 18, 2010, and December 19, 2009 (50th week)*
Reporting area
Legionellosis Lyme disease Malaria
Current 
week












Previous 52 weeks Cum 
2010
Cum 
2009Med Max Med Max Med Max
United States 25 57 115 3,082 3,360 102 396 2,336 27,405 35,914 14 27 89 1,424 1,347
New England — 3 15 234 198 14 121 495 8,048 12,258 — 2 4 69 59
Connecticut — 1 6 50 53 — 42 211 2,659 4,138 — 0 1 1 6
Maine† — 0 4 12 9 14 11 76 702 879 — 0 1 6 2
Massachusetts — 2 10 119 94 — 39 216 2,988 5,213 — 1 3 47 38
New Hampshire — 0 5 21 14 — 23 68 1,218 1,393 — 0 2 5 4
Rhode Island† — 0 4 23 21 — 1 40 149 234 — 0 1 7 5
Vermont† — 0 2 9 7 — 4 27 332 401 — 0 1 3 4
Mid. Atlantic 8 14 45 843 1,157 54 169 733 12,171 15,601 — 7 17 387 397
New Jersey — 2 11 93 213 — 47 216 3,144 4,930 — 0 4 1 97
New York (Upstate) 5 5 19 288 343 36 47 577 2,801 3,954 — 1 6 73 48
New York City — 2 15 147 222 — 2 12 98 1,046 — 4 14 255 199
Pennsylvania 3 6 18 315 379 18 83 383 6,128 5,671 — 1 3 58 53
E.N. Central 7 11 42 685 706 2 24 323 3,013 2,946 1 2 9 140 172
Illinois — 1 15 120 132 — 1 17 123 136 — 1 7 52 69
Indiana 1 2 6 103 60 — 1 7 69 82 — 0 2 8 25
Michigan 1 2 20 169 164 — 1 13 92 101 — 0 4 29 31
Ohio 5 4 15 229 276 2 0 9 39 57 1 0 5 41 37
Wisconsin — 1 11 64 74 — 21 296 2,690 2,570 — 0 1 10 10
W.N. Central 1 2 19 111 115 — 2 1,395 120 292 1 1 11 69 73
Iowa — 0 1 — 23 — 1 10 80 107 — 0 2 13 10
Kansas — 0 2 12 7 — 0 1 6 18 1 0 2 12 8
Minnesota — 0 16 35 12 — 0 1,380 — 158 — 0 11 3 32
Missouri 1 0 4 39 58 — 0 1 1 3 — 0 3 22 13
Nebraska† — 0 2 9 12 — 0 2 9 5 — 0 2 15 8
North Dakota — 0 1 7 1 — 0 15 23 — — 0 1 1 1
South Dakota — 0 2 9 2 — 0 1 1 1 — 0 2 3 1
S. Atlantic 5 10 27 531 579 29 56 176 3,683 4,323 3 7 42 408 351
Delaware 1 0 3 17 19 6 11 32 617 973 — 0 1 2 5
District of Columbia — 0 4 16 23 — 0 4 30 61 1 0 2 11 17
Florida — 3 9 168 184 2 2 10 102 105 — 3 7 130 89
Georgia — 1 4 55 58 — 0 2 11 40 1 0 5 46 67
Maryland† 2 2 6 110 153 7 24 103 1,580 2,015 1 1 22 98 77
North Carolina 2 1 7 58 59 — 1 9 84 94 — 0 13 49 30
South Carolina† — 0 2 14 13 — 0 3 28 42 — 0 1 5 6
Virginia† — 1 10 79 61 14 18 79 1,110 824 — 1 5 64 58
West Virginia — 0 3 14 9 — 0 32 121 169 — 0 2 3 2
E.S. Central — 2 10 128 140 — 1 4 44 39 — 0 3 31 32
Alabama† — 0 2 21 19 — 0 1 2 3 — 0 1 9 9
Kentucky — 0 4 27 52 — 0 1 5 1 — 0 3 8 10
Mississippi — 0 3 10 4 — 0 0 — — — 0 2 2 4
Tennessee† — 1 6 70 65 — 0 4 37 35 — 0 2 12 9
W.S. Central 1 3 14 144 133 — 2 44 99 231 1 1 31 81 70
Arkansas† — 0 2 14 8 — 0 0 — — — 0 1 2 5
Louisiana — 0 3 9 15 — 0 1 2 — — 0 1 5 7
Oklahoma — 0 4 13 6 — 0 2 — — — 0 1 5 1
Texas† 1 2 10 108 104 — 2 42 97 231 1 1 30 69 57
Mountain 1 3 10 159 143 — 0 3 26 56 2 1 4 64 48
Arizona — 1 6 60 43 — 0 1 2 6 2 0 2 27 10
Colorado — 1 5 34 30 — 0 1 3 1 — 0 3 21 26
Idaho† 1 0 1 8 7 — 0 2 8 16 — 0 1 3 3
Montana† — 0 1 4 8 — 0 1 4 3 — 0 1 3 5
Nevada† — 0 2 19 14 — 0 1 2 13 — 0 1 6 —
New Mexico† — 0 2 9 9 — 0 2 5 5 — 0 1 1 —
Utah — 0 2 20 28 — 0 1 2 9 — 0 1 3 4
Wyoming† — 0 2 5 4 — 0 0 — 3 — 0 0 — —
Pacific 2 5 19 247 189 3 4 10 201 168 6 3 19 175 145
Alaska — 0 2 2 1 — 0 1 6 7 1 0 1 5 2
California 2 4 19 207 146 3 3 7 131 108 2 2 13 117 110
Hawaii — 0 1 1 1 N 0 0 N N — 0 1 1 1
Oregon — 0 3 14 17 — 1 4 50 38 — 0 3 14 11
Washington — 0 4 23 24 — 0 3 14 15 3 0 5 38 21
Territories
American Samoa — 0 0 — — N 0 0 N N — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Guam — 0 1 1 — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Puerto Rico — 0 1 — 3 N 0 0 N N — 0 2 4 5
U.S. Virgin Islands — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable.   —: No reported cases.   N: Not reportable.   NN: Not Nationally Notifiable.   Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.   Med: Median.   Max: Maximum.
* Case counts for reporting year 2010 are provisional and subject to change. For further information on interpretation of these data, see http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/phs/files/
ProvisionalNationa%20NotifiableDiseasesSurveillanceData20100927.pdf. Data for HIV/AIDS, AIDS and TB, when available, are displayed in Table IV, which appears quarterly.
† Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
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TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending December 18, 2010, and December 19, 2009 (50th week)*
Reporting area
Meningococcal disease, invasive† 
All groups Pertussis Rabies, animal
Current 
week












Previous 52 weeks Cum 
2010
Cum 
2009Med Max Med Max Med Max
United States 6 15 43 724 921 277 443 1,756 20,127 14,832 16 63 143 3,150 4,927
New England — 0 3 18 34 1 8 22 469 617 4 4 13 216 344
Connecticut — 0 1 3 6 — 1 8 107 55 — 0 9 59 149
Maine§ — 0 1 4 4 1 1 5 48 80 2 1 4 61 53
Massachusetts — 0 2 6 16 — 5 13 252 350 — 0 0 — —
New Hampshire — 0 0 — 3 — 0 2 19 76 1 0 5 14 33
Rhode Island§ — 0 0 — 4 — 0 9 26 45 — 0 4 31 43
Vermont§ — 0 1 5 1 — 0 4 17 11 1 1 3 51 66
Mid. Atlantic — 1 4 70 103 46 34 135 1,797 1,162 2 19 41 995 553
New Jersey — 0 2 17 18 — 3 9 132 234 — 0 0 — —
New York (Upstate) — 0 3 12 23 33 11 79 685 236 2 9 19 485 429
New York City — 0 2 16 17 — 0 9 78 92 — 1 12 120 24
Pennsylvania — 0 2 25 45 13 12 63 902 600 — 8 24 390 100
E.N. Central 1 2 9 123 164 58 102 174 4,992 3,066 — 2 27 226 220
Illinois — 0 3 19 46 — 16 47 875 623 — 1 11 114 82
Indiana — 0 3 26 34 — 9 26 526 372 — 0 0 — 25
Michigan — 0 4 23 20 13 27 57 1,401 851 — 1 5 67 66
Ohio 1 0 2 32 42 45 30 80 1,738 1,052 — 0 12 45 47
Wisconsin — 0 3 23 22 — 8 21 452 168 — 0 0 — —
W.N. Central 1 1 5 52 85 25 36 627 2,340 2,160 — 4 16 243 373
Iowa — 0 3 10 15 — 12 33 614 226 — 0 3 26 34
Kansas — 0 2 7 14 — 3 9 160 237 — 1 4 59 73
Minnesota — 0 2 2 13 14 0 601 712 482 — 0 9 26 60
Missouri 1 0 4 26 27 10 8 44 564 999 — 1 6 66 65
Nebraska§ — 0 2 5 11 — 4 13 211 138 — 1 4 51 77
North Dakota — 0 1 2 1 1 0 30 51 29 — 0 5 15 11
South Dakota — 0 1 — 4 — 0 5 28 49 — 0 0 — 53
S. Atlantic 1 2 7 130 162 19 29 78 1,588 1,572 9 21 70 1,051 2,055
Delaware — 0 1 2 2 — 0 4 14 13 — 0 0 — —
District of Columbia — 0 0 — — — 0 2 11 7 — 0 0 — —
Florida 1 1 5 58 52 7 5 28 310 490 — 0 57 71 161
Georgia — 0 2 13 31 — 4 18 229 221 — 0 6 — 396
Maryland§ — 0 1 9 11 2 3 8 131 147 — 6 14 346 378
North Carolina — 0 2 15 31 — 0 32 132 205 — 0 5 — 461
South Carolina§ — 0 1 12 11 4 5 19 340 252 — 0 0 — —
Virginia§ — 0 2 19 18 6 5 29 296 205 9 11 25 557 543
West Virginia — 0 2 2 6 — 1 21 125 32 — 1 7 77 116
E.S. Central 1 1 3 42 34 7 15 34 751 785 — 3 7 141 137
Alabama§ 1 0 1 8 11 1 4 8 190 294 — 1 4 49 —
Kentucky — 0 2 17 6 — 5 14 263 223 — 0 4 21 45
Mississippi — 0 1 5 3 — 1 8 76 75 — 0 1 1 4
Tennessee§ — 0 2 12 14 6 4 11 222 193 — 1 4 70 88
W.S. Central — 1 9 82 87 48 57 753 2,863 3,199 — 0 30 69 892
Arkansas§ — 0 1 6 9 — 3 29 183 340 — 0 7 28 41
Louisiana — 0 4 14 18 — 1 3 39 147 — 0 0 — —
Oklahoma — 0 7 16 14 — 0 41 91 75 — 0 30 41 33
Texas§ — 1 7 46 46 48 48 681 2,550 2,637 — 0 7 — 818
Mountain — 1 6 55 64 41 27 119 1,680 979 — 1 8 80 105
Arizona — 0 2 14 13 2 7 16 398 263 — 0 5 — —
Colorado — 0 4 21 24 39 4 108 584 225 — 0 0 — —
Idaho§ — 0 1 5 7 — 3 15 184 95 — 0 2 11 8
Montana§ — 0 1 2 5 — 1 16 104 59 — 0 3 17 25
Nevada§ — 0 1 8 5 — 0 7 32 24 — 0 2 8 6
New Mexico§ — 0 1 3 3 — 2 11 131 76 — 0 2 13 26
Utah — 0 1 1 2 — 4 13 237 215 — 0 2 10 13
Wyoming§ — 0 1 1 5 — 0 2 10 22 — 0 4 21 27
Pacific 2 3 16 152 188 32 54 212 3,647 1,292 1 3 12 129 248
Alaska — 0 1 1 6 — 0 6 41 57 — 0 2 12 13
California 1 2 13 101 112 15 34 184 2,796 680 1 1 12 103 224
Hawaii — 0 1 1 5 — 0 6 43 45 — 0 0 — —
Oregon — 1 2 31 42 1 6 16 317 247 — 0 2 14 11
Washington 1 0 7 18 23 16 6 38 450 263 — 0 0 — —
Territories
American Samoa — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — N 0 0 N N
C.N.M.I. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Guam — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — 2 — 0 0 — —
Puerto Rico — 0 0 — 1 — 0 1 3 1 1 1 3 41 39
U.S. Virgin Islands — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable.   —: No reported cases.   N: Not reportable.   NN: Not Nationally Notifiable.   Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.   Med: Median.   Max: Maximum.
* Case counts for reporting year 2010 are provisional and subject to change. For further information on interpretation of these data, see http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/phs/files/
ProvisionalNationa%20NotifiableDiseasesSurveillanceData20100927.pdf. Data for HIV/AIDS, AIDS and TB, when available, are displayed in Table IV, which appears quarterly.
† Data for meningococcal disease, invasive caused by serogroups A, C, Y, and W-135; serogroup B; other serogroup; and unknown serogroup are available in Table I.
§ Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
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TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending December 18, 2010, and December 19, 2009 (50th week)*
Reporting area
Salmonellosis Shiga toxin-producing E. coli (STEC)† Shigellosis
Current 
week












Previous 52 weeks Cum 
2010
Cum 
2009Med Max Med Max Med Max
United States 523 923 1,731 49,527 47,026 53 85 210 4,632 4,402 137 276 527 13,400 15,124
New England 1 32 480 2,198 2,129 — 2 53 194 291 — 4 67 301 335
Connecticut — 0 464 464 430 — 0 53 53 67 — 0 62 62 43
Maine§ — 2 7 128 118 — 0 3 21 19 — 0 1 8 5
Massachusetts — 23 52 1,228 1,124 — 1 9 79 106 — 4 16 207 235
New Hampshire — 3 10 160 256 — 0 2 20 36 — 0 1 12 21
Rhode Island§ — 2 17 140 140 — 0 1 2 38 — 0 2 11 26
Vermont§ 1 1 5 78 61 — 0 2 19 25 — 0 1 1 5
Mid. Atlantic 26 96 219 5,513 5,313 4 10 32 540 416 7 33 53 1,502 2,714
New Jersey — 19 57 1,012 1,091 — 2 9 102 103 — 6 16 331 574
New York (Upstate) 13 25 78 1,384 1,273 4 3 13 198 145 — 3 19 216 217
New York City — 25 56 1,296 1,224 — 1 7 81 56 — 5 14 282 441
Pennsylvania 13 31 82 1,821 1,725 — 2 13 159 112 7 12 34 673 1,482
E.N. Central 34 84 245 5,221 5,027 2 9 39 698 706 11 26 238 1,600 2,467
Illinois — 28 114 1,774 1,429 — 2 9 121 164 — 9 228 775 603
Indiana — 10 62 623 609 — 1 9 67 96 — 1 4 38 76
Michigan 3 15 48 896 943 — 2 16 149 136 2 5 10 242 217
Ohio 31 24 47 1,293 1,375 2 2 11 138 131 9 5 23 302 1,079
Wisconsin — 9 45 635 671 — 3 17 223 179 — 4 21 243 492
W.N. Central 22 46 97 2,424 2,562 6 12 39 645 717 6 42 88 1,964 1,297
Iowa — 9 34 514 397 — 2 16 168 159 — 1 5 51 52
Kansas 2 7 19 431 387 — 1 6 74 54 2 5 14 263 210
Minnesota — 0 32 178 543 — 0 13 31 206 — 0 3 14 76
Missouri 17 13 44 837 642 4 4 27 246 138 4 34 75 1,573 917
Nebraska§ 2 4 13 244 338 2 1 6 77 85 — 1 10 56 34
North Dakota 1 0 39 52 64 — 0 10 17 8 — 0 5 — 4
South Dakota — 3 17 168 191 — 0 4 32 67 — 0 2 7 4
S. Atlantic 260 257 610 15,368 13,973 12 13 30 730 656 49 48 134 2,643 2,296
Delaware 1 3 11 175 140 — 0 2 6 13 — 0 4 40 148
District of Columbia — 1 6 76 99 — 0 1 6 2 — 0 4 26 27
Florida 107 117 227 6,138 6,477 4 4 13 239 170 32 19 53 1,138 447
Georgia 37 40 132 2,697 2,329 — 1 15 103 70 9 14 39 762 645
Maryland§ 24 17 55 1,027 785 6 2 9 107 90 3 2 8 131 362
North Carolina 55 32 209 2,353 1,748 1 1 10 94 109 4 3 36 238 353
South Carolina§ 20 22 99 1,634 1,163 — 0 2 22 33 — 1 5 68 124
Virginia§ 16 19 68 1,098 1,021 1 2 15 132 139 1 2 15 137 181
West Virginia — 2 16 170 211 — 0 4 21 30 — 0 66 103 9
E.S. Central 15 55 177 3,811 3,017 1 4 22 261 212 3 13 40 737 793
Alabama§ 2 19 52 1,018 914 1 1 4 54 47 2 4 14 216 153
Kentucky 1 10 31 557 442 — 1 6 68 71 — 3 28 218 221
Mississippi 2 17 67 1,184 890 — 0 12 30 6 — 1 4 53 48
Tennessee§ 10 14 53 1,052 771 — 2 7 109 88 1 5 14 250 371
W.S. Central 23 111 547 6,090 5,803 8 5 68 283 303 34 53 251 2,682 2,873
Arkansas§ 5 12 43 767 597 — 1 5 47 44 — 1 9 76 307
Louisiana 4 19 49 1,219 1,160 — 0 2 19 23 1 5 13 262 174
Oklahoma 8 12 46 650 601 8 0 27 48 32 1 6 96 252 285
Texas§ 6 68 477 3,454 3,445 — 3 41 169 204 32 42 144 2,092 2,107
Mountain 19 49 105 2,667 2,940 4 11 34 630 554 3 16 32 791 1,109
Arizona 3 17 42 910 1,054 — 1 13 97 67 1 8 18 427 790
Colorado 14 10 24 566 602 — 3 21 209 166 1 2 6 98 95
Idaho§ 2 3 9 161 169 4 2 7 108 90 — 0 3 23 8
Montana§ — 2 7 85 107 — 1 5 41 35 — 0 1 8 11
Nevada§ — 4 22 279 247 — 0 5 32 34 — 1 6 47 74
New Mexico§ — 6 19 317 358 — 1 5 46 37 1 2 10 145 103
Utah — 6 17 310 309 — 1 7 82 110 — 0 4 43 24
Wyoming§ — 0 5 39 94 — 0 2 15 15 — 0 0 — 4
Pacific 123 114 299 6,235 6,262 16 10 46 651 547 24 21 64 1,180 1,240
Alaska — 1 5 78 65 — 0 1 2 1 — 0 1 1 4
California 101 82 227 4,729 4,694 11 6 35 296 260 23 17 51 990 997
Hawaii 2 4 14 216 328 — 0 4 19 11 — 0 3 22 45
Oregon 4 8 48 498 423 — 2 15 117 81 — 1 4 58 52
Washington 16 15 61 714 752 5 3 19 217 194 1 1 20 109 142
Territories
American Samoa — 0 1 2 — — 0 0 — — — 1 1 4 3
C.N.M.I. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Guam — 0 2 7 11 — 0 0 — — — 0 1 1 13
Puerto Rico — 10 39 484 570 — 0 0 — — — 0 1 5 15
U.S. Virgin Islands — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable.   —: No reported cases.   N: Not reportable.   NN: Not Nationally Notifiable.   Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.   Med: Median.   Max: Maximum.
* Case counts for reporting year 2010 are provisional and subject to change. For further information on interpretation of these data, see http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/phs/files/
ProvisionalNationa%20NotifiableDiseasesSurveillanceData20100927.pdf. Data for HIV/AIDS, AIDS and TB, when available, are displayed in Table IV, which appears quarterly.
† Includes E. coli O157:H7; Shiga toxin-positive, serogroup non-O157; and Shiga toxin-positive, not serogrouped.
§ Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
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TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending December 18, 2010, and December 19, 2009 (50th week)*











Previous 52 weeks Cum  
2010
Cum  
2009Med Max Med Max
United States — 2 11 147 145 2 26 421 1,506 1,235
New England — 0 0 — 2 — 0 1 3 11
Connecticut — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Maine§ — 0 0 — — — 0 1 2 5
Massachusetts — 0 0 — 1 — 0 0 — 6
New Hampshire — 0 0 — — — 0 1 1 —
Rhode Island§ — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Vermont§ — 0 0 — 1 — 0 0 — —
Mid. Atlantic — 0 1 3 12 — 1 4 60 95
New Jersey — 0 0 — 2 — 0 1 — 60
New York (Upstate) — 0 1 2 — — 0 3 18 14
New York City — 0 1 1 1 — 0 4 30 7
Pennsylvania — 0 0 — 9 — 0 3 12 14
E.N. Central — 0 1 4 9 — 1 9 91 81
Illinois — 0 1 2 1 — 0 5 33 48
Indiana — 0 1 2 3 — 0 5 43 10
Michigan — 0 0 — 4 — 0 1 1 1
Ohio — 0 0 — — — 0 2 13 18
Wisconsin — 0 0 — 1 — 0 1 1 4
W.N. Central — 0 4 18 19 — 4 21 333 255
Iowa — 0 0 — 1 — 0 1 4 4
Kansas — 0 1 2 1 — 0 0 — —
Minnesota — 0 1 — 2 — 0 0 — 2
Missouri — 0 4 14 7 — 4 20 325 245
Nebraska§ — 0 1 2 8 — 0 1 3 4
North Dakota — 0 0 — — — 0 1 1 —
South Dakota — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
S. Atlantic — 1 9 86 67 1 9 60 508 373
Delaware — 0 1 1 — — 0 3 21 18
District of Columbia — 0 1 1 — — 0 0 — 1
Florida — 0 1 4 1 1 0 2 12 7
Georgia — 1 6 59 52 — 0 0 — —
Maryland§ — 0 1 3 3 — 0 5 54 37
North Carolina — 0 3 13 7 — 3 48 272 242
South Carolina§ — 0 1 1 3 — 0 2 18 15
Virginia§ — 0 2 4 1 — 2 12 131 51
West Virginia — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — 2
E.S. Central — 0 3 19 9 1 5 29 384 255
Alabama§ — 0 1 5 3 — 1 8 76 64
Kentucky — 0 2 6 1 — 0 0 — —
Mississippi — 0 0 — — — 0 3 16 9
Tennessee§ — 0 2 8 5 1 4 20 292 182
W.S. Central — 0 3 6 9 — 1 408 115 141
Arkansas§ — 0 2 2 — — 0 110 64 70
Louisiana — 0 0 — — — 0 1 2 2
Oklahoma — 0 3 3 7 — 0 287 26 46
Texas§ — 0 1 1 2 — 0 11 23 23
Mountain — 0 1 3 17 — 0 2 12 24
Arizona — 0 0 — 11 — 0 1 2 12
Colorado — 0 1 1 1 — 0 1 1 —
Idaho§ — 0 0 — — — 0 1 5 1
Montana§ — 0 1 2 4 — 0 1 1 6
Nevada§ — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — 1
New Mexico§ — 0 0 — — — 0 1 1 1
Utah — 0 0 — — — 0 1 1 1
Wyoming§ — 0 0 — 1 — 0 1 1 2
Pacific — 0 2 8 1 — 0 0 — —
Alaska N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N
California — 0 2 7 1 — 0 0 — —
Hawaii N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N
Oregon — 0 1 1 — — 0 0 — —
Washington — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Territories
American Samoa N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N
C.N.M.I. — — — — — — — — — —
Guam N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N
Puerto Rico N 0 0 N N N 0 0 N N
U.S. Virgin Islands — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable.   —: No reported cases.   N: Not reportable.   NN: Not Nationally Notifiable.   Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.   Med: Median.   Max: Maximum.
* Case counts for reporting year 2010 are provisional and subject to change. For further information on interpretation of these data, see http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/phs/files/
ProvisionalNationa%20NotifiableDiseasesSurveillanceData20100927.pdf. Data for HIV/AIDS, AIDS and TB, when available, are displayed in Table IV, which appears quarterly.
† Illnesses with similar clinical presentation that result from Spotted fever group rickettsia infections are reported as Spotted fever rickettsioses. Rocky Mountain spotted fever (RMSF) caused 
by Rickettsia rickettsii, is the most common and well-known spotted fever.
§ Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
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TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending December 18, 2010, and December 19, 2009 (50th week)*
Streptococcus pneumoniae,† invasive disease
Reporting area
All ages Age <5 Syphilis, primary and secondary
Current 
week












Previous 52 weeks Cum 
2010
Cum 
2009Med Max Med Max Med Max
United States 231 259 495 13,852 2,937 20 44 156 2,068 2,354 43 243 413 11,815 13,442
New England 1 10 99 731 101 — 1 20 91 96 2 9 22 435 315
Connecticut — 0 91 342 50 — 0 16 28 22 — 1 10 89 55
Maine§ 1 2 6 116 19 — 0 1 10 8 — 0 3 23 4
Massachusetts — 1 5 65 3 — 1 4 41 47 — 5 15 260 225
New Hampshire — 0 7 59 — — 0 1 3 11 — 0 2 22 14
Rhode Island§ — 0 36 69 16 — 0 3 3 4 1 1 4 38 17
Vermont§ — 1 6 80 13 — 0 1 6 4 1 0 2 3 —
Mid. Atlantic 12 27 56 1,345 193 5 7 48 351 291 5 33 46 1,568 1,681
New Jersey — 2 8 99 — — 1 5 51 62 — 4 12 223 211
New York (Upstate) 1 3 12 155 84 — 2 19 113 132 2 2 11 126 116
New York City 7 10 32 605 16 4 2 24 131 82 — 18 31 861 1,024
Pennsylvania 4 10 22 486 93 1 1 5 56 15 3 7 16 358 330
E.N. Central 54 57 98 2,838 648 3 7 18 339 406 — 27 49 1,315 1,506
Illinois — 2 7 98 — — 2 5 90 70 — 9 26 446 729
Indiana — 8 24 507 239 — 1 6 43 81 — 3 14 165 155
Michigan 11 12 27 685 26 1 1 6 77 78 — 4 12 206 228
Ohio 27 23 49 1,176 383 2 2 6 94 135 — 10 19 455 351
Wisconsin 16 6 22 372 — — 0 4 35 42 — 1 3 43 43
W.N. Central 14 11 182 728 172 — 2 12 123 175 1 6 18 326 298
Iowa — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 3 17 22
Kansas 1 2 7 103 52 — 0 2 14 18 — 0 3 18 31
Minnesota — 0 179 287 43 — 0 10 44 81 — 2 9 134 67
Missouri — 2 10 121 65 — 1 4 40 44 1 3 9 145 169
Nebraska§ 9 2 7 135 2 — 0 2 15 16 — 0 1 8 5
North Dakota 4 0 11 66 7 — 0 1 2 5 — 0 0 — 4
South Dakota — 0 3 16 3 — 0 2 8 11 — 0 1 4 —
S. Atlantic 62 58 144 3,151 1,318 6 9 27 514 580 21 57 218 2,899 3,250
Delaware — 1 3 39 18 — 0 0 — 3 1 0 1 5 27
District of Columbia — 0 3 26 25 — 0 2 8 7 — 2 21 145 162
Florida 41 23 89 1,402 745 4 3 18 188 198 6 21 43 1,076 1,010
Georgia 2 10 28 539 426 — 3 9 143 174 3 11 167 614 775
Maryland§ 3 8 31 491 4 1 1 6 51 81 1 6 14 295 300
North Carolina — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — 5 6 22 339 567
South Carolina§ 15 7 25 483 — — 1 4 51 50 5 3 7 145 119
Virginia§ 1 1 4 53 — 1 1 4 51 47 — 5 22 275 286
West Virginia — 2 21 118 100 — 0 4 22 20 — 0 2 5 4
E.S. Central 15 22 50 1,229 266 1 2 8 118 149 1 16 39 811 1,102
Alabama§ — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 5 11 234 411
Kentucky 1 3 16 187 76 — 0 2 13 8 1 2 12 122 80
Mississippi — 1 6 55 54 — 0 2 11 28 — 4 17 210 217
Tennessee§ 14 19 44 987 136 1 2 6 94 113 — 5 17 245 394
W.S. Central 39 30 91 1,817 120 3 5 41 279 334 2 36 63 1,823 2,697
Arkansas§ 3 3 9 156 55 — 0 3 17 39 — 3 12 167 271
Louisiana — 2 8 110 65 — 0 3 26 30 1 7 28 412 728
Oklahoma 1 1 5 46 — 1 1 5 46 55 1 1 7 84 91
Texas§ 35 25 83 1,505 — 2 3 34 190 210 — 24 34 1,160 1,607
Mountain 26 32 82 1,727 116 2 4 12 221 294 — 10 25 492 515
Arizona 12 11 51 746 — 1 2 7 93 123 — 3 8 149 223
Colorado 13 10 22 537 — 1 1 4 64 48 — 3 8 132 100
Idaho§ — 0 2 16 — — 0 2 9 9 — 0 2 4 3
Montana§ — 0 2 21 — — 0 1 3 — — 0 2 3 4
Nevada§ — 2 4 77 42 — 0 1 5 7 — 2 9 117 91
New Mexico§ 1 2 9 149 — — 0 4 17 37 — 1 4 50 61
Utah — 3 9 155 62 — 0 3 27 67 — 0 4 37 30
Wyoming§ — 0 15 26 12 — 0 1 3 3 — 0 0 — 3
Pacific 8 5 14 286 3 — 0 7 32 29 11 44 62 2,146 2,078
Alaska 2 2 9 107 — — 0 5 19 19 — 0 1 1 —
California 6 3 12 177 — — 0 2 13 — 9 37 54 1,842 1,855
Hawaii — 0 2 2 3 — 0 0 — 10 — 0 5 35 33
Oregon — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — 1 1 7 66 55
Washington — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — 1 4 11 202 135
Territories
American Samoa — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Guam — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Puerto Rico — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 3 15 202 216
U.S. Virgin Islands — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable.   —: No reported cases.   N: Not reportable.   NN: Not Nationally Notifiable.   Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.   Med: Median.   Max: Maximum.
* Case counts for reporting year 2010 are provisional and subject to change. For further information on interpretation of these data, see http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/phs/files/
ProvisionalNationa%20NotifiableDiseasesSurveillanceData20100927.pdf. Data for HIV/AIDS, AIDS and TB, when available, are displayed in Table IV, which appears quarterly.
† Includes drug resistant and susceptible cases of invasive Streptococcus pneumoniae disease among children <5 years and among all ages. Case definition: Isolation of S. pneumoniae from 
a normally sterile body site (e.g., blood or cerebrospinal fluid).
§ Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
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TABLE II. (Continued) Provisional cases of selected notifiable diseases, United States, weeks ending December 18, 2010, and December 19, 2009 (50th week)*
West Nile virus disease†
Reporting area
Varicella (chickenpox)§ Neuroinvasive Nonneuroinvasive¶
Current 
week












Previous 52 weeks Cum 
2010
Cum 
2009Med Max Med Max Med Max
United States 177 288 550 13,774 19,918 — 0 70 601 385 — 1 53 380 334
New England 6 14 36 728 1,078 — 0 3 13 — — 0 1 2 —
Connecticut — 5 20 289 481 — 0 2 6 — — 0 1 1 —
Maine§ 1 4 15 227 232 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Massachusetts — 0 1 2 4 — 0 2 6 — — 0 1 1 —
New Hampshire — 2 8 114 200 — 0 1 1 — — 0 0 — —
Rhode Island§ — 0 12 32 53 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Vermont§ 5 1 10 64 108 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Mid. Atlantic 29 32 62 1,590 2,009 — 0 19 125 9 — 0 13 62 1
New Jersey — 8 30 505 457 — 0 3 15 3 — 0 6 15 —
New York (Upstate) N 0 0 N N — 0 9 57 3 — 0 7 30 1
New York City — 0 2 2 — — 0 7 32 3 — 0 4 8 —
Pennsylvania 29 22 40 1,083 1,552 — 0 3 21 — — 0 3 9 —
E.N. Central 46 98 176 4,623 6,304 — 0 14 75 9 — 0 7 29 4
Illinois 2 22 45 1,144 1,557 — 0 10 41 5 — 0 4 15 —
Indiana§ 7 6 35 405 443 — 0 2 5 2 — 0 2 7 2
Michigan 17 31 62 1,394 1,872 — 0 6 25 1 — 0 1 4 —
Ohio 17 29 56 1,315 1,864 — 0 1 4 — — 0 1 1 2
Wisconsin 3 7 22 365 568 — 0 0 — 1 — 0 1 2 —
W.N. Central 20 15 32 790 1,257 — 0 7 28 26 — 0 11 72 75
Iowa N 0 0 N N — 0 1 2 — — 0 2 4 5
Kansas§ — 4 22 228 550 — 0 1 3 4 — 0 3 14 9
Minnesota — 0 0 — — — 0 1 4 1 — 0 3 4 3
Missouri 10 7 23 460 571 — 0 1 3 4 — 0 0 — 1
Nebraska§ N 0 0 N N — 0 3 10 11 — 0 7 27 41
North Dakota 10 0 9 47 83 — 0 2 2 — — 0 2 7 1
South Dakota — 1 7 55 53 — 0 2 4 6 — 0 3 16 15
S. Atlantic 19 35 100 2,026 2,518 — 0 4 35 16 — 0 4 21 2
Delaware§ — 0 3 25 12 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
District of Columbia — 0 4 19 30 — 0 1 1 2 — 0 1 1 —
Florida§ 13 16 57 969 1,106 — 0 3 9 2 — 0 1 3 1
Georgia N 0 0 N N — 0 1 4 4 — 0 3 9 —
Maryland§ N 0 0 N N — 0 3 17 — — 0 2 6 1
North Carolina N 0 0 N N — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
South Carolina§ — 0 35 75 134 — 0 1 1 3 — 0 0 — —
Virginia§ 6 10 29 508 746 — 0 1 3 5 — 0 1 2 —
West Virginia — 8 26 430 490 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
E.S. Central 3 5 22 287 545 — 0 1 8 37 — 0 3 11 27
Alabama§ 3 5 22 280 540 — 0 1 1 — — 0 1 2 —
Kentucky N 0 0 N N — 0 1 2 3 — 0 1 1 —
Mississippi — 0 2 7 5 — 0 1 3 30 — 0 2 6 22
Tennessee§ N 0 0 N N — 0 1 2 4 — 0 2 2 5
W.S. Central 38 45 285 2,684 4,784 — 0 15 97 117 — 0 3 19 35
Arkansas§ — 2 32 129 486 — 0 3 6 6 — 0 1 1 —
Louisiana — 2 5 81 134 — 0 3 14 10 — 0 1 6 11
Oklahoma N 0 0 N N — 0 0 — 8 — 0 0 — 2
Texas§ 38 39 272 2,474 4,164 — 0 15 77 93 — 0 2 12 22
Mountain 13 19 36 968 1,329 — 0 18 153 77 — 0 15 125 123
Arizona — 0 0 — — — 0 13 105 12 — 0 9 58 8
Colorado§ 13 8 18 402 512 — 0 5 26 36 — 0 11 55 67
Idaho§ N 0 0 N N — 0 0 — 9 — 0 1 1 29
Montana§ — 3 17 185 163 — 0 0 — 2 — 0 0 — 3
Nevada§ N 0 0 N N — 0 0 — 7 — 0 1 2 5
New Mexico§ — 2 8 94 116 — 0 5 19 6 — 0 2 4 2
Utah — 5 17 273 538 — 0 1 1 1 — 0 1 1 1
Wyoming§ — 0 3 14 — — 0 1 2 4 — 0 1 4 8
Pacific 3 1 6 78 94 — 0 7 67 94 — 0 6 39 67
Alaska 3 1 5 46 55 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
California — 0 0 — — — 0 7 66 67 — 0 6 38 45
Hawaii — 0 6 32 39 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Oregon N 0 0 N N — 0 0 — 1 — 0 0 — 10
Washington N 0 0 N N — 0 1 1 26 — 0 1 1 12
Territories
American Samoa N 0 0 N N — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I. — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
Guam — 0 2 15 32 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
Puerto Rico 1 9 30 528 497 — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
U.S. Virgin Islands — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — — — 0 0 — —
C.N.M.I.: Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands.
U: Unavailable.   —: No reported cases.   N: Not reportable.   NN: Not Nationally Notifiable.   Cum: Cumulative year-to-date counts.   Med: Median.   Max: Maximum.
* Case counts for reporting year 2010 are provisional and subject to change. For further information on interpretation of these data, see http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/phs/files/
ProvisionalNationa%20NotifiableDiseasesSurveillanceData20100927.pdf. Data for HIV/AIDS, AIDS and TB, when available, are displayed in Table IV, which appears quarterly.
† Updated weekly from reports to the Division of Vector-Borne Infectious Diseases, National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases (ArboNET Surveillance). Data for California 
serogroup, eastern equine, Powassan, St. Louis, and western equine diseases are available in Table I.
§ Contains data reported through the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDSS).
¶ Not reportable in all states. Data from states where the condition is not reportable are excluded from this table, except starting in 2007 for the domestic arboviral diseases and influenza-
associated pediatric mortality, and in 2003 for SARS-CoV. Reporting exceptions are available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/phs/infdis.htm.
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TABLE III. Deaths in 122 U.S. cities,* week ending December 18, 2010 (50th week)
Reporting area
All causes, by age (years)
P&I† 
Total Reporting area




Ages ≥65 45–64 25–44 1–24 <1
All  
Ages ≥65 45–64 25–44 1–24 <1
New England 550 395 109 34 6 6 54 S. Atlantic 1,323 849 331 87 30 26 73
Boston, MA 139 84 31 18 3 3 10 Atlanta, GA 168 116 35 12 1 4 12
Bridgeport, CT 22 16 5 1 — — 2 Baltimore, MD 176 97 53 16 3 7 10
Cambridge, MA 24 22 2 — — — 4 Charlotte, NC 134 77 37 13 5 2 5
Fall River, MA 42 34 5 2 1 — 5 Jacksonville, FL 189 115 53 11 4 6 14
Hartford, CT 49 37 11 1 — — 3 Miami, FL 143 92 36 8 6 1 7
Lowell, MA 16 13 2 1 — — 3 Norfolk, VA 57 36 16 4 1 — 1
Lynn, MA 3 2 1 — — — — Richmond, VA 55 34 18 1 1 1 1
New Bedford, MA 33 26 5 2 — — 4 Savannah, GA 66 44 16 4 — 2 6
New Haven, CT 24 15 8 — — 1 1 St. Petersburg, FL 59 34 20 3 2 — 3
Providence, RI 63 45 13 4 — 1 4 Tampa, FL 206 158 29 12 7 — 10
Somerville, MA 4 2 1 1 — — — Washington, D.C. 54 34 14 3 — 3 4
Springfield, MA 42 32 7 1 1 1 5 Wilmington, DE 16 12 4 — — — —
Waterbury, CT 20 17 2 1 — — 1 E.S. Central 815 536 200 43 15 21 77
Worcester, MA 69 50 16 2 1 — 12 Birmingham, AL 165 100 45 9 6 5 18
Mid. Atlantic 2,032 1,437 430 98 33 34 109 Chattanooga, TN 77 50 19 5 — 3 5
Albany, NY 56 39 10 3 3 1 6 Knoxville, TN 99 65 20 9 2 3 14
Allentown, PA 34 27 5 2 — — 2 Lexington, KY 63 44 17 1 1 — 5
Buffalo, NY 82 59 14 2 3 4 8 Memphis, TN 168 119 35 7 3 4 16
Camden, NJ 28 17 10 1 — — 1 Mobile, AL 65 39 20 3 2 1 5
Elizabeth, NJ 21 13 7 — — 1 2 Montgomery, AL 38 27 9 2 — — 2
Erie, PA 64 50 11 2 — 1 5 Nashville, TN 140 92 35 7 1 5 12
Jersey City, NJ 28 20 6 2 — — 1 W.S. Central 1,570 1,020 367 111 41 31 90
New York City, NY 1,010 738 207 35 12 18 47 Austin, TX 123 82 24 8 7 2 7
Newark, NJ 29 19 5 3 2 — 1 Baton Rouge, LA 62 38 12 10 2 — —
Paterson, NJ 22 16 1 4 — 1 2 Corpus Christi, TX 54 39 10 2 1 2 3
Philadelphia, PA 359 217 91 35 11 5 14 Dallas, TX 240 152 51 19 10 8 18
Pittsburgh, PA§ 23 17 6 — — — 3 El Paso, TX 121 81 30 7 — 3 2
Reading, PA 34 26 6 1 1 — — Fort Worth, TX U U U U U U U
Rochester, NY 69 43 22 3 1 — 6 Houston, TX 479 291 119 48 14 7 33
Schenectady, NY 18 14 4 — — — 1 Little Rock, AR 67 42 20 1 3 1 —
Scranton, PA 33 26 4 3 — — 2 New Orleans, LA U U U U U U U
Syracuse, NY 48 38 10 — — — 2 San Antonio, TX 242 166 55 11 3 7 16
Trenton, NJ 37 26 8 — — 3 2 Shreveport, LA 53 34 15 3 — 1 2
Utica, NY 15 13 1 1 — — — Tulsa, OK 129 95 31 2 1 — 9
Yonkers, NY 22 19 2 1 — — 4 Mountain 940 647 200 58 22 13 53
E.N. Central 2,150 1,433 530 113 43 31 127 Albuquerque, NM 119 80 29 7 1 2 7
Akron, OH 62 42 17 — 1 2 5 Boise, ID 58 47 7 2 1 1 3
Canton, OH 42 32 10 — — — 7 Colorado Springs, CO 67 48 11 7 — 1 2
Chicago, IL 224 145 59 15 5 — 11 Denver, CO 79 45 22 7 3 2 —
Cincinnati, OH 88 53 18 8 6 3 5 Las Vegas, NV 277 179 68 19 8 3 17
Cleveland, OH 294 219 61 10 2 2 13 Ogden, UT 42 31 7 1 2 1 4
Columbus, OH 173 112 46 9 3 3 11 Phoenix, AZ U U U U U U U
Dayton, OH 143 106 25 8 2 2 7 Pueblo, CO 38 28 9 — 1 — 2
Detroit, MI 150 77 58 7 7 1 6 Salt Lake City, UT 124 84 23 10 4 3 7
Evansville, IN 36 23 13 — — — 3 Tucson, AZ 136 105 24 5 2 — 11
Fort Wayne, IN 74 51 19 2 — 2 2 Pacific 1,794 1,251 399 84 28 31 176
Gary, IN 9 5 3 1 — — — Berkeley, CA 23 16 2 2 — 2 —
Grand Rapids, MI 61 41 15 2 1 2 6 Fresno, CA 142 102 29 6 2 3 10
Indianapolis, IN 280 150 84 30 10 6 14 Glendale, CA 38 31 6 1 — — 3
Lansing, MI 65 52 9 2 1 1 3 Honolulu, HI 81 63 13 — 5 — 11
Milwaukee, WI 101 66 24 7 2 2 6 Long Beach, CA 80 58 17 3 — 2 15
Peoria, IL 83 59 18 2 3 1 4 Los Angeles, CA 256 161 66 18 6 5 25
Rockford, IL 57 46 7 3 — 1 4 Pasadena, CA 21 18 3 — — — 1
South Bend, IN 52 40 10 — — 2 9 Portland, OR 139 94 34 5 1 5 10
Toledo, OH 76 54 16 5 — 1 4 Sacramento, CA 318 228 75 14 1 — 41
Youngstown, OH 80 60 18 2 — — 7 San Diego, CA 73 47 14 4 2 6 9
W.N. Central 736 483 168 39 22 23 42 San Francisco, CA 123 80 36 6 — 1 16
Des Moines, IA 98 71 18 5 2 2 6 San Jose, CA 202 146 46 6 3 1 14
Duluth, MN 37 22 14 — 1 — 1 Santa Cruz, CA 19 13 4 2 — — 1
Kansas City, KS 26 16 6 2 1 1 1 Seattle, WA 89 60 17 8 3 1 6
Kansas City, MO 114 71 29 7 4 3 10 Spokane, WA 65 44 17 2 1 1 6
Lincoln, NE 47 40 6 1 — — 1 Tacoma, WA 125 90 20 7 4 4 8
Minneapolis, MN 66 41 11 5 5 4 7 Total¶ 11,910 8,051 2,734 667 240 216 801
Omaha, NE 85 60 15 1 4 5 5
St. Louis, MO 141 77 46 8 3 6 3
St. Paul, MN 52 36 9 4 1 2 2
Wichita, KS 70 49 14 6 1 — 6
U: Unavailable.   —: No reported cases.   
* Mortality data in this table are voluntarily reported from 122 cities in the United States, most of which have populations of >100,000. A death is reported by the place of its occurrence and 
by the week that the death certificate was filed. Fetal deaths are not included.
† Pneumonia and influenza.
§ Because of changes in reporting methods in this Pennsylvania city, these numbers are partial counts for the current week. Complete counts will be available in 4 to 6 weeks.
¶ Total includes unknown ages.
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